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INTRODUCTION
The stated purpose of this Conference is to examine the
proper scope of the spending power:  “The Congress shall have
Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, and
to pay the Debts and to provide for the common Defence and gen-
eral Welfare of the United States.”1  My assignment is to track the
relationship, if any, between the expansion of the spending power
and the articulation of the standing doctrine as a principle of
American Constitutional law.  The connection, between the two,
displays at least historical intimacy.  The rise of modern standing
doctrine in American Constitutional Law can be traced with some
precision to Justice Sutherland’s opinion for a unanimous Su-
preme Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon, and its companion case
of Frothingham v. Mellon.2
The substantive dispute in those cases asked whether the so-
called Maternity Act3 lay within the Congress’s spending power by
authorizing federal expenditures of funds to the states for the pur-
poses of promoting maternal and infant health.  The gist of the
challenge, had it been heard, was whether Congress could accom-
plish through grants under Article I, § 8, cl. 1 what it could not
* Interim Dean and James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the
University of Chicago.  This paper was prepared for a Conference on the Spending Clause
held at Chapman Law School in January 2001. David Currie and Adrian Vermuele pro-
vided detailed comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I have also benefited from con-
versations with Jack Goldsmith, Dennis Hutchinson and Richard Pildes.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2 262 U.S. 447 (1923) (consolidated actions).
3 Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224.
1
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accomplish through direct regulation under the restrictive reading
of the commerce clause as it was construed in 1923 before the Su-
preme Court’s 1937 decision in National Labor Relations Board v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.4  The serious constitutional attacks
on this program were deflected on technical grounds when Justice
Sutherland held that neither the state of Massachusetts nor one of
its citizens, Mrs. Frothingham, had the standing to bring suit to
enjoin Mellon, the Secretary of the Treasury, from distributing
funds pursuant to the statutory mandate.  The political impulse
behind Mellon, or at least the political consequence of Mellon was
at root no different from that behind Jones & Laughlin.  In both
cases, the Court’s considered judgment was that no structural lim-
itation found the Constitution blocked—or should be allowed to
block—Congress from wielding the dominant oar in the formation
of national policy on maternal care, or indeed on just about any-
thing else.
To state that conclusion, however baldly, is one thing.  To ex-
plain why it was mistaken to press a doctrine of standing to
achieve that end is quite another.  In this paper, I hope to show
against the wisdom of my own teacher, Alex Bickel,5 that
whatever the appropriate interpretation of the spending power—
and I endorse Madison’s view that it does not give power to Con-
gress to spend for ends that it could not regulate, or which were
not incidental to the operation of its other powers6—the expansion
of Federal power was aided by importing a standing requirement
into the Constitution that often operates at cross purposes with
the function of judicial review that the Court assumed in Marbury
v. Madison.7  Quite simply, the harder it is for individuals to make
their way into federal court, the more difficult it is for them to
challenge actions as falling beyond the scope of Congress.
In many instances, this point is surely overdrawn.  Let this
plaintiff be sent packing, and another plaintiff will be able to find
a separate platform on which to raise the same claim.  On this
view, the standing requirement serves the function of seeing to it
that the right cases get to the Court in the right sequence, assum-
ing that we know what this is.8  But in many cases, including Mel-
lon, the follow-on charge never came because no one could get
standing to challenge the Maternity Act.  In other contexts, how-
ever, when a party with the standing comes, his arrival is too little
4 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
6 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison).
7 5 U.S. 137 (1893).
8 See Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995), and Maxwell Stearns, Standing and Social Choice:
Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309 (1995), for a discussion of standing as a se-
quencing device.
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and too late with respect to programs that have become embedded
in the American political fabric.  So understood, the standing doc-
trine operates as a partial overruling of Marbury.  In addition, it
must be remembered that the doctrine of standing does not oper-
ate, as it is sometimes assumed, only for cases that reach the Su-
preme Court.  It also governs all cases and controversies that arise
anywhere within the federal system as a whole.  It is therefore a
mistake to understand the doctrine chiefly in its relationship to
the Supreme Court and the mysteries of its own docket manage-
ment.  Other tools, such as a simple denial of certiorari can easily
accomplish that function.  Rather, the doctrine of standing should
be understood for what it purports to do—limit the access to fed-
eral courts when a particular plaintiff has come forward to voice a
specific grievance against the named government defendant.
This dissatisfaction with the standing doctrine is not new,
and has been expressed by many commentators.  In most cases,
the position taken is that the private law doctrines of standing
cannot be used to deal with matters of the administrative state.
This point is not unique to the American system, for it also
frames, without any constitutional baggage, the discussion of
standing under English as well as Administrative Law.  In their
leading treatise on the subject,9 Wade and Forsyth begin their dis-
cussion by an account of the “old law of standing” which notes that
the common law system of standing, with its emphasis on individ-
ualized injury, does not work in a public law context:
In private law that principle [of limited standing] can be applied
with some strictness.  But in public law it is inadequate, for it
ignores the dimension of the public interest.  Where some par-
ticular person is the object of administrative action, that person
is naturally entitled to dispute its legality and other persons are
not.  But public authorities have many powers and duties which
affect the public generally rather than particular individuals. If
a local authority grants planning permission improperly, or li-
censes indecent films for exhibition, it does a wrong to the public
interest but no wrong to anyone in particular.  If no one has
standing to call it to account, it can disregard the law with im-
punity—a result that would ‘make an ass of the law’. An effi-
cient system of administrative law must find some answer to
this problem, otherwise the rule of law breaks down.10
These same sentiments have often been expressed, and
rightly, about the structure of American law.  The basic problem of
judicial administration is more or less the same as in England, but
the subject has been tied up with such matters as separation of
powers, the proper interpretation of Article III, and our general
9 See WILLIAM WADE & CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (7th ed. 1994).
10 Id. at 696 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional legacy. The upshot is that under the current federal
constitutional rules of standing, litigants are less able to challenge
unconstitutionality or illegality under the American system than
their English brethren can challenge illegality under their Parlia-
mentary system.  One intriguing explanation for the position,
urged by my colleague Cass Sunstein, is that the Supreme Court
uses the doctrine of standing to mount a covert rearguard effort to
restore the virtues of the Lochner era.11  The basic argument is
that Lochner privileges are in some sense common law entitle-
ments, and it is just these entitlements that give people access
into federal court, so that novel claims brought on behalf of the
beneficiaries of the administrative state received a chillier judicial
reception than actions sought to vindicate a common law right.12
I have little doubt that the American doctrine of standing is in
a sad state of disrepair, but differ with Sunstein as to how the
issue should be approached.  His critique shares one element with
the position taken by Wade and Forsyth, namely that a distinctive
doctrine of standing is needed to account for the development of
public administrative law.  It also seeks to locate the American
reticence on this point in the rearguard effort to preserve some
fragment of the Lochner era.  I disagree with both points.
Turning to the last point first, historically, the doctrine of
standing in American constitutional law was crafted by the
progressives who were anxious to insure that their political initia-
tives, such as the Matrimony Act, and later, the Tennessee Valley
Authority,13 could be shielded from judicial attack.14  Frankfurter
and Brandeis led the initial charge, and Alexander M. Bickel,
their prote´ge´, defended their handiwork in the next generation.15
The variation of the standing litigation that Sunstein attacks is
one that allows the regulated party to attack the sanctions im-
posed while the unregulated beneficiary is not able to spur the
Court into action should the regulated party succeed at an admin-
istrative level.  Yet it is a mistake to assume that most, let alone
all, standing cases have assumed that configuration.  Equally im-
portant in the welfare state are those programs where the direct
11 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of American Law, 88
COLUM L. REV. 1432, 1434-36 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Standing]; Cass R. Sunstein,
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, Injuries, and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV.
163 (1992) [hereinafter Sunstein, After Lujan].
12 See Sunstein, Standing, supra note 11, at 1434-36.  “The use of common-law no-
tions, sharply distinguishing between statutory benefits and nineteenth century private
rights, was the central mark of the jurisprudence of the Lochner period.” Id. at 1436.
13 See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938) (competitive injury
suffered by private power companies was damnum absque injuria); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118 (1939). See discussion infra note 16.
14 See Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Govern-
ance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1443-52 (1988); Sunstein, After Lujan, supra note 11, at 179.
15 See BICKEL, supra note 5.
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP107.txt unknown Seq: 5 24-APR-01 17:01
2001] Standing and Spending 5
beneficiaries of federal or state largesse are insulated from attack
for the receipt of subsidies that either advance comprehensive pro-
grams of redistribution on the one hand, as in Mellon, or which
cause great financial loss to private competitors on the other.16  In
addition, many cases that improperly invoke standing have noth-
ing whatsoever to do with matters of economic liberties, but rather
deal with challenges of grants or property distributions to relig-
ious organizations or with the operation of the CIA or the scope of
the Endangered Species Act.  It is hard to see any Lochner-like
impulse rising up to allow these suits, even though they are
clearly warranted on the general approach that I advance here.
In principle, moreover, it is possible to marry any conception
of standing with any approach to substantive constitutional provi-
sions.  In this context, the modern conservative opponents of Loch-
ner include the leading defenders of a restrictive standing doctrine
on the Supreme Court, most notably Justice Powell and Justice
Scalia.17  The concerns they raise have nothing to do with a partial
effort to resurrect substantive due process, but are directed to the
issues that they discuss: judicial competence; separation of pow-
ers; concrete instantiation of disputes; and redressibility of griev-
ances.  Indeed a close reading of Mellon makes it clear that every
single argument subsequently used to fortify the standing doc-
trine is stated with regrettable clarity in Justice Sutherland’s ini-
tial judicial foray.18
Second, on the analytical front, a mistake in both the English
and the American systems is to think that the modern doctrine of
standing requires a uniquely public law pedigree.  Quite the oppo-
site I think that it is better understood and applied by marshaling
the full resources of the private law to the task.  More specifically,
it becomes absolutely critical not to run together the phrases “the
common law” and “the private law” as though they were synony-
mous, when in fact they are different.19  The private law compre-
hends all suits between private parties and covers both the
common law courts and the courts of equity,20 which before the
twentieth Century operated as distinct courts both in England
16 See, e.g., Alabama Power, 302 U.S. at 479, discussion infra note 57 and accompany-
ing text.
17 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), for Justice Scalia’s decision
following his earlier views as stated in Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter Scalia, Doctrine of Standing].
18 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19 The equivalence is found through both Sunstein articles. See, e.g., Sunstein, After
Lujan, supra note 11, at 163.  “In the context of standing, the reluctance to take this step
has been embodied in a private law model of standing—that is, in the idea that standing
should be reserved principally to people with common law interests and denied to people
without such interests.” Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
20 See FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, EQUITY (2d ed. 1969) on the history of this subject.
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and in many of the United States, and which were distinguished
chiefly by the remedies that they offered for certain violations of
law—specific performance, injunctions, foreclosures and the like,
often on a discretionary basis.  Understanding how the private
law works in total requires understanding where these equitable
principles reinforce common law rights and where they go still
further, particularly in fashioning various kinds of structural in-
junctions.  The modern law of standing does not require any repu-
diation of private law models.  Rather, it calls for their faithful
application to both sides of the legal/equitable divide.  There is in
short no need to develop a distinctive set of standing principles for
the administrative state.
Stating the overall problem of standing in this fashion leads
to the obvious question: wherein lies the source of this technical
obstacle to the assertion of judicial power, not only in the cases
involving Congress’s spending power, but outside that realm.  In
seeking to understand the problem, it is surely worth noting at the
outset the term “standing” nowhere appears in Article III, which
provides that “the Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made under
their Authority.”21
In reading this language I assume that a “case” covers any
case where the interest of two parties are adverse to each other—
that is, that it operates as a word of limitation only insofar as it
excludes the use of advisory opinions, which everyone regards as
outside the scope of the federal judicial power.  But I do not think
that it imports any arcane meaning that recognizes only certain
kinds of legal disputes count as cases for the purposes of constitu-
tional law.  Indeed the words “all” and “extend” carry with them
expansive, and not restrictive, meanings.  By the same token, the
term “equity” refers to the Chancellor’s equitable jurisdiction.  To
be sure, the anti-royalist sentiment of the early founding period
made many people reluctant to confer equitable powers on both
federal and state courts.  But that movement did not win out in
the end precisely because injunctions and specific performance are
needed in too many ordinary disputes that come into both federal
and state court.  The key issue here is therefore not the existence
of a dispute over the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, but the
clean victory that the proponents of equity achieved, as evidence
in the parity found in the expression “cases in law and equity.”
This reading of course makes good sense wholly without any
reference to the term standing or the ideas that it imports.  The
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.  The point has been duly noted in Sunstein, After Lujan,
supra note 11, at 168.
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want of the word “standing,” however, does not necessarily entail
the death of a doctrine.  By way of comparison, surely the Consti-
tution cries out for some police power limitation on its explicit
guarantees of individual rights, even though the words “police
power” appear nowhere in the Constitutional text.22  By the same
token, however, the task of implication should never serve as an
open sesame for judicial invention.  Rather, implied limitations on
explicit provisions should always face an uphill struggle, lest they
wipe out the substantive guarantees they are supposed to
restrain.
The question then arises how any putative limits should be
determined and applied.  In answering that question, I propose
what I believe to be the only methodology that allows for the co-
herent interpretation of difficult constitutional texts.  My ap-
proach derives the standard doctrines of constitutional law by
examining the analogous principles of private law, comprehending
both its common law and equity sides.  The approach is surely not
confined to the standing doctrine.  The background constitutional
norms—be they of freedom of speech or religion, of private prop-
erty, of contractual obligation—all gain their salience from the
role that freedom, property and contract play in organizing the
rights and duties between ordinary private individuals.  To deter-
mine what it means for the state to take property from a private
person, first determine what it means for A to take the private
property of B.23  And so it is that we quickly understand that tak-
ings include not only outright dispossession but also lesser limita-
tions on any of the bundle of property rights—the right to exclude,
the right to use, and the right to dispose of property—but not the
right to use force or commit nuisances against neighbors.  Simi-
larly, in determining how far freedom of speech and religion ex-
tends, a good place to start is with the rightful restrictions that
one person can impose on the speech or religious liberty of an-
other.  So assaults, defamation, frauds, and human sacrifice do
not gain constitutional protection in order to advance the cause of
“freedom.”  Any individual is entitled to stop these actions by his
neighbors.  But it is often difficult for any individual to prevent
these actions before they take place, for no one knows who the
robber or the reckless driver will hit. The state uses public force to
coordinate the enforcement of these diverse individual interests in
a systematic and disinterested fashion.
The same analytical approach carries over to the law of stand-
ing.  Private law doctrines contain all sorts of rules that address
22 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER (1904), for one exhaustive account of what it entails.
23 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35-38 (1985), for a greater elaboration of this approach.
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the question of which individuals are allowed to seek redress from
what wrongs.  Once these principles are understood, they supply
the necessary vantage point for understanding the uses and limits
of the standing doctrine in public law, both in spending clause
cases and beyond.  In reply, an objection is, that it is treacherous
business to move from legal doctrines that govern in courts that
have plenary jurisdiction to the federal courts whose jurisdiction
is limited to a specific set of cases and controversies.  Indeed, it is
this point that moves Justice Scalia when he argues that stand-
ing, far from being an outgrowth of general private law issues, is
treated as part and parcel with the doctrine of separation of
powers.24
Yet it is possible to offer two strong responses to that position.
First, the English courts have plenary jurisdiction and yet they
also incorporate into their administrative law some doctrine of
standing as a limitation on private suits.25  It follows therefore
that to the extent that these doctrines are at play in connection
with courts of unlimited jurisdiction, then they carry over to
courts whose powers are confined to specified causes.  Second, the
distinctive limitations on the federal judicial power do not come
from the terms “case” or “controversy” but from the delineation of
the three types of case so listed, which is then supplemented by
the remaining types of cases so enumerated. The difference be-
tween plenary and limited jurisdiction does not need a doctrine of
standing to explain it; nor does it require any special meaning be
attached to the word “case.”  It only requires us to read through to
the end of Article III, section 2 to find which cases and controver-
sies fall within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
How then should one understand standing?  One common
view is that standing does not raise any separate problem at all,
but must be understood against the backdrop of the substantive
law.  Thus Professor Fletcher writes:  “The essence of the true
standing question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal
right to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty?  This ques-
tion should be seen as a question of substantive law, answerable
by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision whose
protection is invoked.”26  But this formulation misses the distinc-
tive nature of the standing claim.  To see why, it is instructive to
break down the issue into two separate questions.  One is whether
24 See Scalia, Doctrine of Standing, supra note 17. His point derives from Sutherland’s
original decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See discussion supra note
18.
25 See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 696-718.
26 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 229 (1988). See
also, David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 41, 43 (“Whether
the answer is labeled ‘standing’ or ‘cause of action,’ the question is whether the statute or
Constitution implicitly authorizes the plaintiff to sue.”).
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standing is a necessary condition for a cause of action, and the
other is whether it is a sufficient condition for the cause of action.
To the extent that one asserts an equivalence between the stand-
ing and the cause of action issues, it looks as though both of these
conditions should be satisfied.  But clearly it is possible to find
cases where a party has standing to sue even though he does not
have a cause of action.  The defendant shoots the plaintiff.  Surely
the plaintiff has standing to sue for that injury.  Yet standing is
not a sufficient condition for recovery. Thus the plaintiff does not
have a cause of action if the shooting was accidental, and the sub-
stantive law required proof of either negligence or intention for
the action to go forward.  The point here is that the plaintiff has
standing in the sense that he is, as will be developed later, one
person who is in the best position to urge that some relief should
be granted—and remains in that position even if his case is dis-
missed on the merits.  But the semantic equivalence at common
law between standing and a cause of action is broken.  Standing
looks as though it were a necessary condition for a cause of action,
but not a sufficient one.
At this point what establishes the standing as a general mat-
ter?  One obvious answer is that the standing requirement is met
when it is shown that the plaintiff has suffered “harm,” even if the
other elements of the cause of action are not satisfied.  For the
moment, I shall put aside all the heavy freight that is attached to
this term, and content myself with the observation that the Su-
preme Court has understood the doctrine of standing, and in good
tort-like fashion tied the doctrine to the frequent cases where indi-
viduals seek redress for personal grievances, usually by invoking
principles of corrective justice—that is, those principles, compen-
diously described that stress the wrong that this defendant has
done to that plaintiff.  But its effort to locate the doctrine of stand-
ing with tort doctrines has led to the fatal mistake in this area,
which is to ignore a second class of cases, which commonly were
brought in the courts of equity in which a single individual sues
not for individual redress, but to preserve the structural limita-
tions found in our or any other constitutional order.
The difference lies in the kinds of remedies that are sought:
the common law typically awarded damage for invasion of a spe-
cific right.  The courts of equity could fashion complex remedies by
way of injunctions, damages, reorganization, prohibitions, and
foreclosure that were designed to stabilize and recreate long-term
interests among multiple parties.  In some of these cases the equi-
table relief was designed to regulate conduct between strangers:
the injunction of a nuisance for example.  Such cases fit easily
within the tort category by supplying remedies against strangers.
But in other cases, such as derivative actions and reorganizations,
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP107.txt unknown Seq: 10 24-APR-01 17:01
10 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 4:1
the courts of equity entered into more complex areas by interven-
ing into the governance structure of voluntary associations and
other collective entities.  It takes a certain ingenuity to find in the
phrase “all Cases, in Law and Equity” some magical limitation
that prevents the exercise of judicial power when plaintiff asks for
equitable relief in cases that fall into this second category.  Quite
the opposite, the Constitution created a fusion in the federal
courts that took a good deal of time to implement in many of the
states and in England.  The grant of jurisdiction in equity thus
invites the use of federal courts to use structural remedies in
those cases of equitable jurisdiction that call for it, and to devise
remedies to deal with the conflicts of interest that inevitably arise
in dealing with these multi-dimensional matters.  In this regard
the ambiguity in the formulation of the problem offered by Wade
and Forsyth should be now evident.  It is not correct to say that
“no particular person is injured” when the state grants a planning
approval or allows the showing of the indecent film.  Rather, it is
that a great many individuals are all injured by some small but
perceptible amount.  The task of courts of equity was to develop
rules that allowed the amalgamation of small interests.  As will
become clear, the rise of the standing doctrine has depended at
critical junctures on the denigration of the equitable powers of the
court.
It is now possible to identify the two ways in which the law of
standing has veered from its correct course.  The first of these has
been to give a narrow and indefensible definition of “harm,” which
can be traced for the false insistence that standing and cause of
action are in some sense equivalent concepts.  But even after that
mistake is cleared away, a greater vice remains—the insistence
that a plaintiff show a redressible interest for some individuated
wrong in order to obtain relief from a structural wrong.27  Unfortu-
nately, the structure of current standing law applies the same re-
quirements for both classes of claim: to the corrective justice
claims and the totally different issues raised by the structural
challenges.  Thus the hornbook requirements of standing under
current law hold that for all cases the plaintiff must have suffered
what is termed an “ ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally pro-
tected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b)
‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical” ’.”28  Next,
in good common law style today’s hardy plaintiff must show the
“causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
27 See e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 488-90
(1982).
28 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (setting out the require-
ments) (citations omitted).
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of.”29  The explication of this doctrine moves unerringly to the doc-
trines of causal intervention, by stipulating that “the injury has to
be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.’ ”30  And last, again in terms that echo
the common law requirement for proof of damages, the harm
“must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury
will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision’.”31
It is for good reason that exhaustive examinations of the early
law of standing do not reveal any of these requirements.32  Had
they been present, then the entire tradition of equity jurisdiction
would have been dismissed as irrelevant to determining the scope
of constitutional powers.  I think that the direct injury test—
which itself has been misunderstood—wholly misunderstands
how the doctrines of standing are used in private law adjudica-
tion, both at common law and in courts of equity.  The simplest
way to state the point is to note that the rules for issuing an in-
junction in equity need not track closely those for awarding dam-
ages at common law, and that this distinction turns out to be most
relevant in cases that seek to obtain structural relief and not indi-
vidual redress.  The former necessarily depends on the fungibility
of plaintiff’s interests with other persons similarly situated; in
contrast, the latter depends on the demonstration of special or dis-
tinctive wrong.  In order to show the interplay and the distinction
among these various issues, I propose to look first at the full range
of cases that call into question the standing doctrine—not always
under that name—in private law suits both in law and equity.  Ac-
cordingly, Part I of this paper begins the analysis of the private
law doctrine of standing by building on four common law deci-
sions, —Ashby v. White,33 Vosburg v. Putney,34 Tarleton v. Mc-
Gawley,35 and Anonymous,36 a 1535 decision that articulated the
rules for private suits against the creators of private nuisances.  I
shall then look at the way in which the standing doctrine plays
out in contract and corporation cases.
Part II of this paper then carries over the fruits of that analy-
sis to the public law arena in order to dissect the analysis of stand-
ing in the Supreme Court case law.  I shall begin by providing a
29 Id.
30 Id. (alteration in original).
31 Id. at 561.
32 See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gov-
ernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1443-52 (1988); Sunstein, After Lujan, supra note 11, at
167-79.  See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 696-718, for a short English account.
33 90 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1702-03).
34 50 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. 1891).
35 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
36 Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535), reprinted in RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 706 (7th ed. 2000).
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detailed analysis of Massachusetts v. Mellon, and then work for-
ward selectively to the modern day, taking into account first those
cases in which the “direct harm” requirement is relevant, but mis-
construed, and then those cases that deal with structural harms.
My purpose is to show the conceptual poverty of a legal approach
that seeks to use the same rules to govern individual grievances
and structural challenges.  In light of this analysis I hope to ex-
plain the important role that citizen and/or taxpayer suits should
play in determining standing under Article III.  These limitations
matter, for often times noncitizens, like nonshareholders, should
not be entitled to bring suit.  But stated in that fashion, the doc-
trine of standing is far simpler, and far less important, than under
the current view.
Finally, in part III, I shall address in connection with the
standing doctrine an issue that is implicit in equity cases but
largely irrelevant in ordinary tort suits.  What should be done in
those cases when the individual plaintiff does not in fact, either as
shareholder or citizen, have an interest that is in common with
those of other individuals that he purports to represent.  The
question here is to ask how, once these equitable suits are allowed
in Federal Court, the judicial powers should be exercised in ways
that take into account the interests of the full range of parties who
support and oppose the initial action.  In this regard I shall ad-
dress questions of joinder of party, choice of remedy, and the abil-
ity of Congress to confer standing on citizens and taxpayers by
legislation.
I. THE PRIVATE LAW OF STANDING:  TORTS
My first illustration is the famous English decision of Ashby v.
White.37 The issue before the Court of King’s Bench was whether
Matthew Ashby stated a cause of action when he alleged that the
defendants, local constables, had wrongfully excluded him from
voting at Ailesbury to elect two burgesses to represent that Bor-
ough in Parliament.  The decision does not say which higher-up, if
any, ordered these lowly constables to exclude the plaintiff from
the polls; nor does it speculate on their motivation.  A majority of
the King’s Bench denied the plaintiff any relief at all.  Holt, C.J.
dissented insisting that “it is not at all material whether the can-
didate, that he would have voted for, were chosen, or likely to be,
for the plaintiff’s right is the same, and being hindered of that, he
has injury done him, for which he ought to have remedy.”38  On
appeal the House of Lords sustained his judgment.39
37 90 Eng. Rep. 1188 (1702-03).
38 Id. at 1189.
39 Id.
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Ubi ius, ibi remedium—where there is a right, there is a rem-
edy.  In Lord Holt’s hands the tort law shows a flexibility that al-
lows it to move far beyond the ordinary cases of beatings and
automobile accidents.  Alas, it is here that the complications be-
gin. Just what remedy does this plaintiff have?  The use of the
action on the case indicates that the plaintiff himself had elected
to sue for damages, and did so under an all-purpose writ that is
not tied to any one substantive theory.  Surely, Ashby did not seek
to invalidate the election or to install his preferred candidate in
office.  But now the questions fly thick and fast.  What is the ap-
propriate measure of damages?  Does it cover only the visible dis-
pleasure of being excluded from the exercise of a right? —and to
Holt it was a property right “by reason of his freehold.”40  Or does
it take into account the possibility that this particular vote could
have altered the outcome of the election, even though that did not
happen in this case?  What should be done if more than one person
had been excluded from the polls?
The inquiries can run wider.  In thinking about the case, is it
permissible to ask whether the exclusion of the plaintiff was antic-
ipated by or known to other potential electors whose own conduct
was altered, such that if all their votes had been combined to-
gether, the outcome in question would have been changed in a
manner to the plaintiff’s liking.  If it could have been shown that
the single vote would have altered the outcome of the election,
what then would have been the appropriate measure of damages?
Then, there are institutional questions.  Parliament (like Con-
gress) normally has control over the admission of members to its
ranks.  Did the personal action brought by Ashby trench on the
power of Parliament to determine who shall sit in its member-
ship?  Should other individuals, including the candidates have the
power to challenge the outcome of the election even if Ashby had
chosen not to sue?
Ashby looks quite different from an ordinary torts case such
as Vosburg v. Putney,41 in which the plaintiff brought suit for ex-
tensive damage below his knee that he claimed had resulted from
a intentional kick by the defendant, albeit one that meant no
harm. It raises questions about the precarious position of the ex-
tra-sensitive plaintiff, the implied license of the playground, the
mental state needed to establish unlawful intention, the relation-
ship between assault and battery, and the differences in damage
rules for contract and tort.  It also sports a complex sociological
history about the local tensions that erupted between the plaintiff,
40 Id.
41 50 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. 1891).
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a sickly local farm boy, and the defendant, the son of one of the
most powerful families in town.42
Yet the complexities between the two cases conceal what look
to be very different centers of gravity, and it is around those dif-
ferences that much of the law of standing necessarily resolves.  In
Vosburg we have no difficulty—or at least we think we have no
difficulty—in answering the threshold question of all lawsuits:
why is this plaintiff suing this defendant, and what remedy does
he hope to achieve?  The obvious plaintiff is the party who sus-
tained the physical injury; and the only remedy that makes any
sense for him is damages for redress of this injury, so long as the
defendant was its cause.  Now that the injury is past, he does not
need injunctive relief when the possibility of a recurrence is virtu-
ally nil.  It looks as though this suit is a pure action for the rectifi-
cation of a particular harm that falls well within the customary
province of the tort law.  Aristotle’s model of corrective justice call-
ing for compensation from A to B for harms inflicted fits quite
well,43 whether we think corrective justice is an end in itself, or a
means to advance some consequentialist—that is, some utility or
wealth maximizing goal of the law.  The plaintiff, we might say,
has standing to sue because he has suffered (or claims to have
suffered) an injury in fact.  And we can think of no plausible defi-
nition of harm inflicted that is so narrow as to exclude physical
injuries that result from a direct blow.
So Vosburg seems to suggest the standing question solves it-
self in physical injury cases.  But we can make the analytical prob-
lem more complicated in a perverse but instructive way, by
expanding the circle of harm.  Thus we can ask whether or not the
parents have a separate right of action to recover their medical
expenses, or perhaps even the loss of familial rights stemming
from his particular injury.  At this point we have to expand the
doctrine of redressible injury to cover cases of loss of consortium, a
move that American (but not English) courts have been prepared
to do when the one spouse sues for his or her personal loss from
the death or injury of a spouse.44  But the cases on whether par-
ents can sue for the loss of consortium of a child is a matter that
meets divided opinion and stout judicial resistance.45  Still, does
42 See Zigurds Zyle, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1 WIS. L. REV. 877 (1992).
43 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book 5, Ch. 4 reprinted in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF
THE WESTERN WORLD 339, 379 (W.D. Ross trans., 2nd ed. 1990) (treating “the justice in
transactions between man and man”).
44 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 17.10, at 451-53 (1999) for a discussion. See also
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. 1950) (for the key decision extending the right
of consortium from husbands to wives). See Administration of Justice Act, 30 & 31 Eliz. 2
§ 2 (1982) (for the abolition of all actions for loss of consortium in England, and abolishing
all such actions for parents, children and menial servants).
45 Compare Borer v. American Airlines, 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (denying action for
death of children), with Berger v. Weber, 303 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1981).
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Vosburg, or more importantly, the garden variety intentional tort
pose a situation in which we can credibly deny that the aggrieved
husband, wife, or parent has suffered some injury-in-fact?  Cer-
tainly we cannot take the position that a husband is indifferent to
the death of his wife, the wife to the death of her husband, or ei-
ther to the death of the child.  If there is an injury in fact, then
why is there sometimes no right to claim redress for the loss in
question?
If we are cleverer still, we can extend the circle one step fur-
ther and ask whether any person, including those who are unre-
lated to the plaintiff by blood or marriage—I skip over the case of
the second-cousin once removed— could recover for the disruption
of friendships and associations that predated the onset of injury.
There is some obvious difference between individuals in the third
circle and those who inhabit the second.  As a general matter, we
can be confident that more people inhabit the third circle than do
the second, but that each of these suffer smaller disruptions in
their personal and professional lives than do putative second tier
plaintiffs.  But if the question is whether they are indifferent to
the physical harms suffered by the person who sustained physical
injury, the answer to that question is again an emphatic no.  So if
they have suffered an injury in fact, then why aren’t they all enti-
tled to have standing as well?  We have drawn such lines in the
bystander emotional distress cases.
Finally—for it hardly pays to go any further—if we are truly
clever, we can ask the question of why every person who had some
positive probability of forming some gainful association with the
plaintiff could not recover for that lost probability.  No heroic as-
sumptions are required at least if, to paraphrase Holt, C.J., it is
irrelevant that he would have enjoyed the benefits of that rela-
tionship, or was likely to enjoy that relationship.  Once again, do
not ask for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee, under the philo-
sophical doctrine of internal relations.  If all of us are diminished,
why is it that only one of us, the direct victim of the loss is assured
standing?
From these hypotheticals, it should be evident that the idea of
“harm” associated with some wrongful act is not confined by some
logical dictate to the direct physical consequences of a blow.
Rather, we can arrange the individuals who suffer from these
harms in concentric circles, with the physical victim at the center.
The decision on whether or not to allow individuals in the outer
rings to bring suit necessarily entails an interplay of social factors
that are not captured in any one-dimensional definition of harm.
Wholly apart from any constitutional or jurisdictional demands,
the social task is to figure out what set of actions should be al-
lowed to serve social objective, such as Guido Calabresi’s claim
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that the tort law is structured to minimize (the sum of) the costs of
these harms, the cost of their prevention and the cost of their ad-
judication.46  Trying to approach that question in the round is dif-
ficult to say the least since no one carries a social welfare function
about in his head.  But we can make progress in that direction by
asking whether or not the addition of a given cause of action into
the mix improves the overall situation.  And when we do this, the
direct harm requirements that play such a large role in standing
decisions turn out to have their sensible common law equivalent.
In Vosburg and other physical injury cases, the sensible ap-
proach is to start from the center.  Clearly a situation that allows
any person to strike another person with impunity is an invitation
to social chaos, anarchy and vigilante justice.  It is easy therefore
to make the judgment that it is worth bearing the costs of allowing
the victim of the blow to have an action against the injurer, and to
do so on the grounds of corrective justice that Aristotle defends.
The suit involves one plaintiff against one defendant; the circum-
stances needed to judge the legality of the act are confined to a
tight location and a short time frame.  The objective of deterrence
is clearly advanced, and the payment of damages helps the victim
to return, at least partially, to his pre-accident state of utility.  All
the pieces come together in a single whole.
It is precisely because conferring on the direct victim the
standing to sue is so easy that all other actions in the outer rings
become problematic, at least if we take intuitive heed of the three
variables in Calabresi’s formula.  As we move out from the center
in physical injury cases, the injuries become more attenuated, the
number of parties become more numerous.  The cost of adminis-
tration runs high, yet the marginal deterrence from the second
suit is not likely to be great, and some of the losses to family mem-
bers can be built into the basic award to the direct victim himself.
In the end it is easy to see why mature legal systems could go
different ways on allowing these actions for consortium, and why
they are uniformly more willing to allow the action to a single
spouse than to a bevy of children: I know of no case where the
action for loss of consortium is granted to the children but denied
to the spouse.
The balance of convenience swings sharply, however, in the
opposite direction when we move to the outer circles.  Now the
number of parties is so numerous, the perceived damages so
small, the costs of suit so great, and the possibilities of abuse so
large, that we categorically deny that these plaintiffs have stand-
ing to sue.  It is easy, too easy, to justify this conclusion by saying
that people in the outer circles suffer no harm.  It is more accurate
46 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
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to say that their standing to sue in part because the functions of
deterrence have already been well served by allowing the tort ac-
tion to the immediate victim of the harm and perhaps to his close
relatives.  We make this judgment categorically because we know
enough from the basic sketch to be certain that no particularized
harm is likely to lead to any sensible exceptions to that rule in
sufficient quantity (if any) to justify the high error costs of a case-
by-case analysis.  We therefore use the standing term to cover
these categorical exclusions because it captures the social unwill-
ingness to delve deeper into the circumstances of particular cases.
This pattern of concentric circles does not, however, describe
cases like Ashby.  To be sure, the victim suffers the direct indig-
nity of loss, but the change in the outcome of the election, or in the
behavior of voters generally, does not impact that one voter any
more than it does anyone else.  The idea that we should use indi-
vidual tort actions to correct for structural features in the opera-
tion of elections now seems a bit forced, as a second-best
alternative.  Ideally, we would appoint an election commission to
oversee elections.  That body could order the constables to let
Ashby vote if he protests before the polls close.  It could add his
vote to the tally after the polls close. More to the point, its reme-
dies are not limited to the correction of injustices between the im-
mediate parties, nor even to a showing of individual harm.  The
Commission could impose fines on the constables who kept Ashby
out; it could investigate who gave them orders; and it could order
a new election if it thought that voting irregularities were wide-
spread.  The point here, however, is that the system seems to func-
tion far better if Ashby is put in a position to protest to some
independent authority so that he need not go through the bother
and expense of a tort suit in the first place.  Indeed in many cases
the true source of uneasiness is that Ashby will not care enough
about the outcome of the election to incur the costs of a suit that
promises much heartache for small personal damages.  The struc-
tural harms to the system seem to call for a structural solution.  It
would hardly seem out of place to prevent the courts from being
the forum of individual suits once a workable administrative ap-
paratus were put into place.
We have still not finished the private law side of this story, for
we have yet to take into account those cases in which some indi-
viduals suffer specific harms and others suffer (not derivative
losses) but the general inconveniences from the inefficient opera-
tion of some public facility.  To see how that situation might be
handled, it is useful to see how the common law of public nuisance
furnishes yet another benchmark against which the law of stand-
ing can be measured.  The origin of this doctrine is caught by an
anonymous 1535 English case that deals with the right of private
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actions for the obstruction of a public highway.47  The situation
can arise when, for example, a private party places an obstruction
on a public highway that slows down traffic along the road, and
which also places a barrier that makes it impossible for an adja-
cent landowner to reach the road at all.
The judges in that case were divided in their views on
whether the adjacent landowner had standing to sue.  Baldwin,
C.J. held that the appropriate remedy was not a private suit for
this plaintiff but an action brought by the King on his behalf:
“there is no reason for a particular private person to have an ac-
cion sur son cas; for if one person shall have an action for this, by
the same reason every person shall have an action, and so he will
be punished a hundred times on the same case.”48  The clear model
of Baldwin’s decisions is that the blocking of the highway is a
structural problem for which a single administrative remedy is
appropriate.  The alternative private actions are too numerous;
their harms are too diffuse and difficult to measure.  The public
action thus achieves a higher level of deterrence at a lower admin-
istrative cost.  It is a model similar to that used for the public su-
pervision of elections.  What is there not to like about his solution?
Plenty, it turns out.  The majority opinion of Fitzherbert did
not take issue with Baldwin’s conclusion that the King could have
his action with respect to this nuisance.  But it held that it did not
follow that standing to sue for their harms had to be denied to all
the private claimants.  Rather, in language that anticipates that
of the modern standing cases, the court concludes that it should be
possible to carve out, from the general mass of travelers, those few
individuals that have suffered “greater displeasure” and “special
hurt.”  But who might those people be? Fitzherbert had two an-
swers, one obvious, and one less so.  The former is that an action
for personal injury should be allowed to any individual who was
hurt by crashing into the obstruction.  The harder case, which he
allowed, was the one before him, that of the adjacent freeholder
whose access to the public lands was blocked by the obstruction.
At this point, the private losses loom larger, while the number of
plaintiffs shrinks.  The actions look pretty much like ordinary tort
suits.
Our Anonymous 1535 case raises issues that resonate in mod-
ern times; indeed the law of England has not moved an iota from
this position in nearly 500 years.49  Suppose now the defendant
47 Anonymous, Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, f. 27, pl. 10 (1535), reprinted in RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 706 (7th ed. 2000).
48 Id.
49 See WADE &  FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 698 (“If a public right is under threat, a
private person may seek an injunction in two cases:  if some private right of his is inter-
fered with at the same time (e.g. by obstruction of the highway which also obstructs access
to his land); and where he suffers special damage peculiar to himself from the interference
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pollutes public waters, causing massive death of the fish that live
in the lake.  The modern issue raises the same question as before.
Do we content ourselves with administrative action against the
wrongdoers—fines, clean up campaigns, and the like—or do we
allow private rights of action for those parties that are specially
aggrieved by the wrongs?  The case is a bit more complicated than
the older public nuisance, for if one commercial fisherman is al-
lowed to sue for the loss of his catch, then why not all?  The mod-
ern cases thus allow actions by the commercial fisherman,50 and in
some cases at least the owners of marinas, bait, tackle and boat
stops.51  But by the same token, standing, yes standing, is denied
to folks in the next circle out, to wit various seafood wholesalers,
retailers, and distributors who marketed the catch of the local
commercial fisherman.
In some cases, however, the best plaintiffs may not be located
in the inner circle, for this does not take into account the complex
law of relational interests and its connection to the law of unfair
competition.  Thus suppose a defendant shoots at customers of the
plaintiff to scare them away from his business or school, as hap-
pened in Tarleton v. McGawley,52 or shoots across the bow of a
boat of African natives who wished to trade with the plaintiff.53
Public criminal prosecutions could of course be brought for these
deliberate wrongs, but in many contexts may not.  Hence we must
be concerned with the interplay between public and private suits.
No one questions that the direct victims of the assault are entitled
to sue for their losses.  But once they cut and run, individually
they are unlikely to sue for their losses, given that they can go
elsewhere for business or education.  One way to overcome this
difficulty of course is to organize a class action that combines their
claims.  But another, more ingenious approach, is to allow the ac-
tion for (intentional) interference with prospective advantage to
the business or school that was forced out of business for its over-
all losses.  Here the combined effect of the defections of individual
customers means that this firm suffers some special loss above
and beyond the ordinary individuals in society, and conferring
with the public right.  In other cases it was held that only the Attorney-General could vin-
dicate the public right.”).
50 See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
51 See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (for the record, in
summarizing this case for my torts casebook, I used the language of standing long before
this article was written. “Still another difficulty with the private action involves determin-
ing which individuals have standing to bring suit for their economic losses.” RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 711 (7th ed. 2000)).
52 See, e.g., Tarleton v. McGawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (K.B. 1793).
53 Lord Holt also fits into this category as well, by allowing the action against the
schoolmaster of the “antient school” who uses force to keep his young scholars from going to
work for a rival. See Keeble v. Hickeringill, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1228 (Q.B. 1706) (reported
in K.B. 1809) (for his discussion).
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standing to sue nicely serves the conventional tort purposes of de-
terrence and compensation.
At this point the difference between no standing and no cause
of action becomes clear.  More specifically, we can find cases of
standing but no cause of action, as in the many instances where
one competitor suffers harm because of the market behavior of an-
other.  After all, low prices can easily lead rational customers to
defect from their prior vendors.  Most of these cases properly deny
on categorical grounds any relief whatsoever, given the long-term
benefits to society.  One great defect of John Stuart Mill’s famous
harm principle is that it does not purport to assess the differential
welfare conditions of physical harms from economic competition.54
But even if these plaintiffs should go home empty-handed,
surely they should be given an explanation in court as to why they
lose, which is not because they have not been hurt unless we take
the quixotic view that economic losses just do not matter.  Indeed,
courts in some cases, have to face the question of whether to recog-
nize actions for predation in economic markets, and even if these
are frowned upon under the antitrust laws,55 the statute books
have been filled with protectionist legislation designed to protect
everything from labor unions and airlines, to dairy products, from
ruinous competition.  Those protective actions, whether by com-
mon law or statute, may be unwise as a matter of policy.  But if,
and perhaps because, that is the case, the refusal to supply the
desired protection is defended candidly on the grounds that eco-
nomic protection comes at too high a cost, and not on the ground
that the injured competitor has not been harmed by his rival’s
action.
Indeed to say generally that competitive injury does not count
leaves it unintelligible as to why a plaintiff has standing, or the
tort law offers protection, against unfair competition when illegal
means—force intimidation, defamation and the like are used.56
From this point, it is only a short step to an issue that will turn
out to have constitutional significance: Is one competitor entitled
to enjoin the actions of a rival who has benefited from illegal sub-
sidies or contracts with another?57  Here again, the harm principle
54 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) reprinted in 40 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD 267, 271 (2nd ed. 1990) (“the sole end for which mankind are warranted,
individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number,
is self-protection.  That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”); see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY 9-39 (1998) (for my elaborate
criticism).
55 See Matsushita Elec. Co. v. Zenith, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
56 See Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889) (Bowen, L.J.), for
the classic English exposition of the difference.
57 See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938), supra note 13 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Justice Sutherland’s use of damnum absque injuria.
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has to be supplemented with a substantive account of what behav-
iors should be illegal and why.
The definition of harm, moreover, for the purposes of this
analysis is not necessarily tied to physical infliction of loss or com-
petitive injury.  Just to complete the picture, it is clear that some
firms, e.g. common carriers, are under a duty to serve their cus-
tomers, and these customers have a valid cause of action when
they have not been given the service owed to them.  But they also
have standing to protest the refusal of any ordinary individual to
provide them with service.  They might well lose that action
against an ordinary business at common law, even if they could
succeed under the various antidiscrimination statutes.  But once
again the plaintiff does not have to have a valid cause of action in
order to plead his case.  Standing is a doctrine that allows people
in the court house door to present their claim.  It would be odd to
see how the law could develop if the only persons who were al-
lowed to plead their cases were those who had already survived a
common law demurrer or a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim.
Thus far the analysis of the harm principle and its relation-
ship to the tort law has proceeded on the assumption that all these
various actions were directed against the wrongful conduct of
some private party.  The cases, especially those devoted to public
nuisance and interference with advantageous relations, show how
to police the line between general and special damages, and allow
the law to combine private rights of action with public administra-
tive action.  Clearly the Crown’s action brought against the crea-
tor of the private nuisance includes the cost of its removal and
correction.
However, what should be done when the obstruction on the
public road results from an act or lapse by some public official act-
ing within the scope of his authority?  Once again the rules for
private nuisance offer some useful direction.  In those cases of di-
rect harm, the action should lie against either the sovereign or the
official, depending on the scope and direction of the interlocking
doctrines of sovereign and official immunity.  The problem of spe-
cific harms therefore does not create any problem for the doctrine
of standing in private law.  It should come as little or no surprise
that cases that allege these harms do not raise a standing ques-
tion under federal constitutional law either.
The far harder question is what, if anything, should be done
in the event that the public obstruction causes widespread and
diffuse harms, in circumstances where no single person can claim
a discrete harm.  That is the precise analogy to the voting case,
where no special injury occurs.  When a private party creates a
public nuisance, the response is to confer an action on the Attor-
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ney General.  But now that the King (or any other executive) or
his agents are the perpetrators, they can hardly be expected to
bring actions to control their own misconduct.  In order to keep
alive Holt’s hope of ubi ius, ibi remedium, the task is to position
someone to challenge the system-wide irregularities.  Where the
question turns, moreover, from damages to injunction, the claims
of sovereign and official immunity have to yield, for otherwise the
inability to impose any restraint on the sovereign entails the end
of judicial review because no one can force the President or Con-
gress to toe the line.58  It follows therefore that injunctive relief is
often critical to the enforcement of the structural limitations
found in the Constitution, just as it is critical to protect all citizens
against voting irregularities.  To a lawyer steeped in the private
law tradition, the discussion thus immediately gravitates to class
or representative actions in which one person champions reforms
that help benefit all.  At this point, the appropriate set of private
analogies to the standing law has to cover more than tort-like
cases to the law of contract generally and to the law of voluntary
associations corporations more specifically.  Here is how the story
plays out.
A. Standing, Contracts and Corporations
A second source for the public law of standing comes from the
law of contract.  To see how the doctrine of standing evolves
within this category, start with the simple case in which A has
made a promise to B, which is then breached.  The normal rule
routinely allows B to sue for that breach of conduct.  Indeed, we
can take the matter one step further.  In the typical case, only B is
entitled to maintain that action against A.  Thus suppose that
some party C has entered into a contract with B that B can only
perform if A first performs her contract with B.  Can C maintain
an action for breach of promise against A, even though not a party
to the A-B contract?  The invariable answer to that question is in
the negative, except today in those cases in which C can show that
he was an intended third-party beneficiary of the original con-
tract.  The basic impulse is that B has a direct stake in his rela-
tionships with A and that he should have the right to decide
whether to enforce any obligations owing to him, or to waive or to
compromise them.  In the usual case B will act out of his self-in-
terest in dealing with A, and will seek to secure the maximum
return from the arrangement.  To allow C an action against A is to
divide the control B has over his contractual rights.  And if C can
come into the picture, then why not D, E, and F?  The basic privity
limitation in the law of contract—only parties to the agreement
58 See, e.g, Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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are entitled to maintain actions on it—thus represents an applica-
tion of the standing doctrine to the law of contract, designed to
prevent the endless proliferation of actions for a single breach of
duty.59  These other parties have probably been made worse off by
the breach of contract; indeed, given the extensive level of com-
mercial interdependence surely they are.  So as with the tort cases
we use a standing doctrine as a filtering device to treat some indi-
viduals as though they were not harmed even though we know
they were.
The law of contracts also links together large numbers of indi-
viduals in some collective enterprise through an endless array of
partnerships, associations, corporations, and other legal entities.
These collective organizations could seek to specify in great detail
all the rights and duties of the respective parties.  But generally,
their broad set of purposes makes it foolhardy to even try to set
out the particulars in a complete contingent state contract.  In the
alternative, what these private organizations do is to adopt their
own constitution in order to create an internal governance struc-
ture complete with a president and a management team and over-
sight through some board of directors.  These private
organizations have many structural resemblances to political or-
ganizations.60  In particular they face the same trade-offs between
the necessity for quick and effective action on the one hand, versus
the need to prevent factional intrigue that could lead to expropria-
tion of some members of the business for the benefit of others. All
these composite organizations are set up by voluntary transac-
tions, and individuals will not participate in them if they think
that the expected return on their investment is negative.  Any
practice therefore that allows one group of investors or sharehold-
ers to profit by redirecting the capital of another group to itself
will, since it will be anticipated, lead to stillborn associations.  The
59 See Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-99 (N.Y. 1928), where Car-
dozo put the point as follows:
The plaintiff would have us hold that the defendant, when once it entered upon
the performance of its contract with the city, was brought into such a relation with
everyone who might potentially be benefited through the supply of water at the
hydrants as to give negligent performance, without reasonable notice of a refusal
to continue, the quality of a tort. . . . We are satisfied that liability would be unduly
and indeed indefinitely extended by this enlargement of the zone of duty.  The
dealer in coal who is to supply fuel for a shop must then answer to the customers if
fuel is lacking.  The manufacture of goods, who enters upon the performance of his
contract, must answer, in that view, not only to the buyer, but to those who to his
knowledge are looking to the buyer for their own sources of supply. Id.
Note that in Cardozo’s view, the assertion that these claims count as tort claims means
that they could not be brought if the defendant did not begin the performance of his agreed-
upon work.  But if contract doctrine applied, then the defendant could be held liable even if
the contract were fully executory.
60 See Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906
(1988) for an elaboration of the point.
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organizers must put in place safeguards against these abuses in
order to induce the initial participation in the joint venture.
One set of techniques used to control the risk of abuse, is to
impose certain limitations on the kinds of transactions that can be
taken by the executive alone, and even the executive in consulta-
tion with the Board of Directors.  The traditional doctrine of ultra
vires sought to control the problem of abuse by limiting the ends
to which the collective assets could be devoted, and do so even at
the cost of preventing the firm from engaging in certain profitable
transactions.  In addition, it was commonplace to insist that the
firm’s officers set aside the necessary reserves for capital expendi-
tures, and to obtain the necessary bonds and guarantees for the
performance of work by outside parties.  Likewise, the basic char-
ter could impose limitations on the capacity of the officers and di-
rectors of the firm to enter into a reorganization or sale of its
assets.
Now suppose that officers and directors do some action, which
is arguably in excess of their delegated powers.  Who should be in
a position to sue?  Here the obvious candidates for the suit are
those members or shareholders who are aggrieved by the action.
In the typical organization, however, many individuals may fall
into the same position.  It becomes quickly obvious that a multi-
plicity of individual lawsuits does not offer a rational means to
counter abuse at the center.  But the response here is never to say
that since all shareholders are equally aggrieved, then none are
entitled to a cause of action.  Rather, it has always been under-
stood that the greater danger is that the stake of any individual
member or shareholder will be too small relative to the operation
of the system as a whole.  The business risk is that no individual
will therefore share the entire cost of suit when the benefits inure
to all members and shareholders as a class.  That result is likely
to hold where the relief sought is individual damages to be paid
directly into the pocket of the named plaintiff.  But here at least
the party who sues does not perforce confer a benefit on others
who are similarly situated, because it is possible for a defendant to
pay money to A without paying it to B.
It is therefore certainly possible to let direct shareholder ac-
tions proceed by individual suits or by permissive joinder, espe-
cially in cases of ordinary tort harms.  But the indivisibility of the
relief sought becomes almost a truism when the suit is brought in
equity to enjoin a reorganization, to stop the consummation of an
improper contract with a third party, or to remove an officer or
director.  Now we have a case of the creation of a limited public
good from which all members or shareholders will benefit equally
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whether they support its creation or not.61  All individuals now
stand in the same positions as members or shareholders.  To deal
with such situations, the courts of equity created the shareholder’s
derivative action.  The basic legal position has been succinctly
summarized:
The claim, however, may be that management’s wrongdoing has
directly injured the corporation and has thereby prejudiced the
shareholders only indirectly.  For example, the charge may be
that directors or officers have breached their fiduciary duties by
taking excessive salaries or appropriating corporate opportuni-
ties, or that management has improperly declined to enforce a
corporate cause of action against outsiders.  In these circum-
stances, the shareholders’ injury (diminution in the value of
their shares) derives from the fact that the alleged misconduct
has reduced the value of the corporation’s assets.  Further, this
type of derivative injury is suffered in common by all sharehold-
ers according to their proportionate interest in the corporation.
The shareholders’ derivative suit was created by equity courts
to permit a shareholder to vindicate wrongs done to the corpora-
tion as a whole that management, because of either self-interest
or neglect, would not remedy.  It allows a shareholder to bring a
secondary (or derivative) action on behalf of the corporation
(and thus all its shareholders collectively) in contrast to the di-
rect (or primary) cause of action in which shareholders assert
their own rights.  It may be viewed as a peculiar type of class
suit in which the shareholder asserts a right of the corporation
for the benefit of all who have an interest in the corporation’s
success.62
Note that the devices in question were created not by common
law courts but by courts of equity with their flexible remedial
structures.  One clear implication from this passage is that the
only persons who have an “interest in the corporation’s success”
are the shareholders of the corporation.  Here too this conclusion
is not meant to describe the economic consequences of corporate
misconduct, by setting up the false pretense that the adverse ef-
fects of corporate misconduct has no effect on people who have
business arrangements with corporate shareholders.  Rather, lim-
iting derivative actions to shareholders operates as a standing
limitation with respect to equitable actions.  So long as the share-
holders, or any fraction of them, will proceed with suits, individu-
61 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965) for the classic discus-
sion.  Note that a public good need not benefit all members of society equally.  It is enough
that we can identify any group, all of whose members will benefit so long as one of them
does, and the standard corporation implies that all assets of the firm are public goods to its
membership.
62 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 785-86 (3rd ed.
1989).  Note also the implicit standing limitation in the last sentence.  The only people who
have “an interest in the corporation’s success” are the shareholders. Id.
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als in the next outer ring should be shut out of bringing suit
altogether.  No one, except shareholders, has standing to protest
any of the forms of corporate misconduct.  The limitation derives
from an understanding of the complex web of business limitations.
It has nothing to do with the limited jurisdiction of the state or
federal courts in which these actions are brought.
One possible way to avoid the analogy is to argue that share-
holders all suffer injury and thus satisfy the direct injury test of
the standing law.  But if that is the case, then so do ordinary citi-
zens and taxpayers who stand in the same relationship to their
government that shareholders stand to their firm.  But in fact the
use of the derivative action is meant to cover cases where no par-
ticular shareholders have any suffered any special injury at all.
Given the need for derivative actions, it is clear that state and
federal rules have to accommodate this concern by developing
what looks in all but name to be a form of class action.  The origins
of the equitable class action in federal court long precede the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 or the major
revision of the class action rules in 1966.63 Accordingly, in its least
controversial application, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have authorized the use of class actions for all persons similarly
situated as against the defendant.64  The Notes to the 1966 Fed-
eral Rules make clear the strength of this case:
In an action by policy holders against a fraternal benefit associ-
ation attacking a financial reorganization of the society, it
would hardly have been practical, if indeed it would have been
possible, to confine the effects of a validation of the reorganiza-
tion to the individual plaintiffs.  Consequently a class action
was called for with adequate representation of all members of
the class.65
So understood, this use of the class action is designed to
achieve three organizational goals simultaneously.  First, it per-
mits the passive individuals some say in the control and the oper-
ation of the lawsuit.  Second, in the event of success, it permits the
representative of the class to obtain some recovery for the work
expended on behalf of the class proper, such as through a cash
payment from the association or corporation made defendant in
the suit.  Third, after some equivocation, it now binds all class
63 See FLEMING JAMES ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 10.21 (1992) for a brief account.
See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921) (a representative early
case).
64 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
65 Id. at advisory committee’s note, clause B (citing Ben-Hur, as well as a large num-
ber of corporate derivative actions dealing with “the proper recognition and handling of
redemption or pre-emption rights”).
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members, so that if the class action loses, the defendant does not
have to face a repetition of suits.66
Once again, it is important to see how these equitable concep-
tions carry over from private associations to governments.  The
analogous situation is one in which a municipal government en-
ters into a contract that is ultra vires.  In dealing with these cases,
the uniform nineteenth century rule was that any citizen or tax-
payer of the local government, just like any shareholder of the cor-
poration, could sue to enjoin the transaction.  Thus in Crampton v.
Zabriskie,67 the question was whether a member of the local town-
ship could enjoin the completion of a contract on the ground that
the local government had entered into a contract for future work
for which it had not, in violation of its charter, secured the requi-
site funding either through cash on hand or taxes already owing.
Justice Field had no difficulty in allowing the taxpayer action, not-
ing that it corresponded to the uniform practice of the time:
Of the right of resident tax-payers to invoke the interposition of
a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys
of the county or the illegal creation of a debt which they in com-
mon with other property-holders of the county may otherwise be
compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question.  The
right has been recognized by State courts in numerous cases;
and from the nature of the power exercised by municipal corpo-
rations, the great danger of their abuse and the necessity of
prompt action to prevent irremediable injury, it would seem em-
inently proper for courts of equity to interfere upon the applica-
tion of the tax-payers of a county to prevent the consummation
of a wrong, when the officers of those corporations assume, in
excess of their powers, to create burdens on property-holders.68
In the course of his decision Field cited Dillon’s well-known
treatise on Municipal Corporations.69  My examination of the 5th
Revised edition of 1911 shows the synergy between the Court and
treatise writer.  Dillon for his part quotes extensively from
Crampton to support the general proposition that taxpayers and
property holders may have an injunction.70  Earlier he writes as
follows:
In the country, the right of property-holders or taxable inhabi-
tants to resort to equity to restrain municipal corporations and
their officers from transcending their lawful powers or violating
their legal duties in any mode which will injuriously affect the
property-holders or taxpayers, —such as making an unautho-
66 See, e.g., Ben-Hur, 255 U.S. 356; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
67 101 U.S. 601 (1879).
68 Id. at 609. See also Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540, 550 (1865).
69 Crampton, 101 U.S. at 609; JOHN F. DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 5th ed.
§ 1579-81  (1911).
70 See DILLON, supra note 69, § 1581, at 2767.
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rized appropriation of the corporate funds, or an illegal or
wrongful disposition of the corporate property, or levying and
collecting void and illegal taxes and assessments upon real
property. . . —has, without the aid of statutory provisions to
that effect, been affirmed or recognized in numerous cases in
many of the States.  It is the prevailing, we may add, almost
universal doctrine on this subject.  It can, we think, be vindi-
cated upon principle, in view of the nature of the powers exer-
cised by municipal corporations and the necessity of affording
easy, direct, and adequate relief against their misuse.71
It is worthy of note, moreover, that Dillon immediately justi-
fies this decision by drawing an appeal to the jurisdiction that eq-
uity courts have over private corporations where the “the ultimate
cestuis que trust are the stockholders.”72  Thereafter Dillon insists
that the shareholders of a corporation, whether public or private,
should be able to maintain an action to restrain unlawful conduct
if the officers of that corporation fail to do so:
But if the officers of the corporation are parties to the wrong, or
if they will not discharge their duty, why may not any inhabi-
tant, and particularly any taxable inhabitant who will be ad-
versely affected, be allowed to maintain in behalf of all similarly
situated a class suit to prevent or avoid the illegal or wrongful
act?  Such a right is especially necessary in the case of munici-
pal and public corporations, and if it be denied to exist, they are
liable to be plundered, and the taxpayers and property-owners
on whom the loss will eventually fall are without effectual
remedy.73
Dillon clearly contemplates the aggregation of small fungible
claims into one large claim.  Consistent with the decision in
Crampton, he does not contemplate a requirement of a distinctive
claim for this particular taxpayer or citizen, nor does he tie the
ability to bring suit to the substantive nature of the underlying
claim.  The same principle that governs incurring a debt in
Crampton could apply to any other activity, such an illegal con-
tract that calls for services to be rendered to the corporation.  In
no sense is the logic of Dillon’s treatise or Crampton limited to
cases of liquidated damages.  Indeed, an injunction may be all the
more necessary when damages are hard to quantify, for that only
increases the strength of the claim that damages are not adequate
as a matter of law- a hallmark of nineteenth century equity juris-
prudence.  Nor does it matter whether this shareholder or citizen
represents the majority view.  Any one party can challenge illegal-
ity, just as one party to a contract can insist on its enforcement
71 Id. § 1579, at 2763-64.
72 Id. § 1580, at 2766.
73 Id. at 2766-67.
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when all the others wish to abandon the deal.  Those who wish to
defend the legality of the transaction can intervene on the other
side if they think that the corporate (or public) officers have not
mounted a spirited defense.  But once again, the clear view here is
that on issues where defendants have to provide a public good to a
class, no party suffers a discrete injury.  The common law re-
sponse may allow no party a cause of action.  The equitable re-
sponse allows anyone to bring that suit.
This examination of the private law analogies thus shows,
quite clearly, the development of two distinct lines of authority,
one in law and one in equity, for determining which parties should
have standing to bring suit, for personal redress on the one hand
or for structural injunctions on the other.  Two very different
standing doctrines emerge quite naturally out of the substantive
and remedial aspects of both situations, even for suits brought in
courts with plenary jurisdiction.  In both cases, the doctrine neces-
sarily cuts out from the legal system some individuals who can
only show some economic harm that follows in consequence of the
wrongdoing of other individuals.  But in both cases, the standing
doctrine is applied because it proves possible to identify a smaller
group of better situated individuals to prosecute the actions at
lower cost.  In effect, individuals whose interests are derivative
and indirect receive a mandatory free ride from those persons
whose right of direct action reduces the likelihood of breach in the
first place.  But more to the point, they are forced to accept the
role of free riders against their will.  In principle, a legislature
could change matters by rejecting the standing doctrine and creat-
ing a private right of action in, say, the children of injured parties.
Yet there are differences.  In common law actions where the
plaintiff seeks damages, the action goes to the party whose dis-
tinct interest allows him to stand out from the crowd. In contrast
on the equity side, relief is meant to protect public goods for a
class of individuals of which the named plaintiff is only one.  Now
the revised remedial focus leads to a transformation in the logic of
standing.  No longer is it appropriate, let alone necessary, for the
plaintiff to show that he has a special or disproportionate interest.
Rather, the precise opposite becomes the norm: the success of the
class or representative action depends on the ability of the named
plaintiff to show that he is indistinguishable from other persons in
the same class.  Distinctive injuries; special burdens; unique con-
nections are no longer prerequisites to a legal action; they become
obstacles to it.  The great institutions regulated by equity depend
on the creation of abstract entities—corporations, partnerships,
and associations—to work because they are, to use the new
jargony word, scalable.  Their interests are additive without limit
because they are fungible.  Only when those conditions are satis-
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fied can one person effectively represent all.  Exactly how the class
action is managed depends on the complex rules for the selection
of the lead plaintiff, the scope and definition of class membership,
the allocation of expenses and recovery, and a myriad of other
details.
This radical difference in approach between law and equity
has profound implications for understanding the constitutional
doctrines of standing, to which we now turn.  But the upshot
should be briefly stated.  The Supreme Court’s standing jurispru-
dence uses the standing rules for common law damage actions to
govern cases of equitable relief.  In so doing the Court manages to
realize the worst fears of the traditional, public choice theorist.  As
writers from Aristotle74 to Russell Hardin75 have stressed, one
great weakness of a system of individual rights is that it creates
this paradox: The public’s business becomes nobody’s business be-
cause no person has the incentive to take steps to protect that in-
terest.  The various forms of equitable action count as ways to
make the public’s business everyone’s business, and the judicial
response is to make sure that we return to the state of nature in
which everybody’s business is again nobody’s business.  As the
next section shows, this one conceptual blunder turns everything
upside down.
II. STANDING AS A MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Massachusetts v. Mellon—A Closer Look
As noted earlier, the standing doctrine was born in fact, but
not by name, during the progressive era in Massachusetts v. Mel-
lon.  Yet the political dynamics of the case are often not well un-
derstood so that it is wise to summarize them here.  The most
obvious question is why Massachusetts sought to nullify a statu-
tory program when it could have escaped its tentacles by refusing
to participate in that program at all.  The only state agencies that
fell under the thumb of the federal Children’s Bureau established
under the Act were those who sought out its money.  Where is the
coercion or imposition in that?
The answer to the case starts, perhaps with the appellant’s
citation in argument to the Supreme Court’s then recent decision
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,76 in which the Court had invalidated a
federal statute that sought to ban from shipment in interstate
commerce any product of any firm or its affiliate that had been
74 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book II, ch. 3 reprinted in 8 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WEST-
ERN WORLD 439, 456 (B. Jowett trans., 2nd ed. 1990) (“For that which is common to the
greatest number has the least care bestowed on it.”).
75 See RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8 (1982).
76 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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made in a plant that hired under-aged children in violation of fed-
eral child-labor statutes, which were more stringent than their
state equivalent. Hammer clearly brought into graphic relief the
question whether the commerce power could be used as an indi-
rect means to regulate the local conditions of manufacture.77  Here
the United States explicitly stated that the national regulation of
child labor was needed in order to prevent what the Solicitor Gen-
eral, John W. Davis, regarded as the ruinous competition among
the states, which were, he claimed, in a kind of prisoner’s di-
lemma.78  Each state would have passed tougher child labor laws
if not for the decisions of rival states to have more lenient mea-
sures.  The claim was that only Congress could prevent the unfair
competition between the states and the race to the bottom to
which it was said to lead.  But the congressional strategy upset
the balance between state and local power.  Congress could not
force all individuals to abandon their ordinary common law rights
as a condition for entering into interstate commerce.  The firms
subject to the regulation were allowed to challenge the congres-
sional power to leverage its control over transportation and inter-
state sales into control over local manufacture.  They were not
barred by any notion of consent flowing from their knowledge of
the federal statute when they shipped their goods in interstate
commerce.  To tolerate this congressional strategy in the one case
opens the door to comprehensive federal regulation that no busi-
ness is able to resist: the cost of compliance with these statutes is
low compared with the cost of losing gains from all interstate
trade.  If forced to that choice, everyone will capitulate to the fed-
eral terms of trade, so that any enclave of state powers is effec-
tively eroded.  What is true, moreover, about direct prohibition on
the shipment of goods, applies to a tax equal to ten percent of prof-
its of any firm that uses child labor.  So just before Mellon, the
Court struck down such a tax in the Child Labor Tax Case.79  The
clear implication of that decision is that the power to tax (but not
necessarily to spend) as contained in Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 was limited,
as Madison claimed, to taxes that could be harmonized with the
substantive powers contained elsewhere in Art. I, § 8.
Counsel for Massachusetts raised in explicit form the chal-
lenge to the aggressive use of spending power as well.  Counsel did
so because he had to show that he was entitled to protest the car-
rying on of a program that Massachusetts was free not to join.  He
77 See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV.
1427-32 (1987) [hereinafter Epstein, Commerce Power], and RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAIN-
ING WITH THE STATE 146-50 (1993), for a more extensive statement of my views.
78 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 256-57, discussed in Epstein, Commerce Power, supra note 77,
at 1429-30.
79 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
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also recognized, after a fashion, that his case presented an altered
version of the constitutional prisoner’s dilemma game raised in
Hammer.  In both cases, the use of a federal program was de-
signed to thwart the competition between states that develops
within a federalist system when each state formulates its own sys-
tem of maternal care.
When the Maternity Act is examined in these structural
terms, a state cannot vindicate its constitutional position simply
by refusing to accept the proferred statutory benefits, any more
than a manufacturer could keep its independence by refusing to
ship goods in interstate commerce.  Let Massachusetts refuse to
participate in the Maternity Act programs, and citizens remain
subject to the taxes in question, which are now directed elsewhere.
The Maternity Act not only uses tax revenues from the states that
participate in the program, but it uses tax revenues from states
that refuse to participate in the program.  The coercion comes
from the linking of the benefit offered to the prior tax.  In principle
every state could prefer an outcome of no tax/no benefit, but so
long as no state can undermine the power to tax, the dominant
strategy for each state is to take the benefit.  With the tax firmly
in place, the fact of consent only allows the state to choose be-
tween its second and third choices: participate or don’t participate,
but by all means pay.  Each state knows moreover that once it
opts out the deal becomes ever sweeter for the states that remain.
Faced with these constraints, no state has any way to obtain
its first alternative—stop the program in its tracks because its
scope lies outside the spending clause—unless it can sue to dis-
mantle the program.  The upshot is that just carrying on the pro-
gram, with or without Massachusetts’ participation, necessarily
skews the balance of power between the central government and
the states.  Indeed even if a majority of other states are prepared
to wink at the Constitutional violation, Massachusetts should still
be allowed to challenge its constitutionality.  The limits on the
spending clause should not be determined by majority vote.  Until
the scope of the standing clause is changed by explicit constitu-
tional Amendment, then each single state has a vested right to
make every other state play by the rules of the game.  All these
points were well understood by the Assistant Attorney General
(Alexander Lincoln) who argued the case for Massachusetts.80
The case thus offers an ideal setting for a structural injunction,
which offers the only chance to stop the program in its tracks.
Justice Sutherland, however, saw none of this. His approach
is to divert and conquer.  The diversion begins when he confuses
standing with political question.  Massachusetts, he wrote, did not
80 See Lincoln’s argument in, Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 459-66 (1923).
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present a “justiciable controversy either in its own behalf or as the
representative of its citizens.”81 Mrs. Frothingham is similarly
prevented from raising these issues as a citizen or taxpayer.  But
Mellon does not seek to challenge the political judgments of the
United States in deciding to enter foreign treaties.  Nor does it
resemble a case where the governor of one state refuses to honor
some “moral obligation” to return a fugitive from justice to the
state where the crime was committed.  It is strictly and solely a
question of the legality of the program under the spending clause.
Having first muddied the waters, Justice Sutherland then
turns to the structural issues raised in Mellon.  He reaches exactly
the wrong conclusion about them because he misses the prisoner’s
dilemma problem.  In order to soften the blow for the standing
analysis, he writes that “In the last analysis, the complaint of the
plaintiff State is brought to the naked contention that Congress
has usurped the reserved powers of the several States by the mere
enactment of this statute, though nothing has been done and
nothing is to be done without their consent.”82  This point is not
essential to his decision, but the reference to consent raises a red
herring in light of the overall structural issues that Mellon, like
the Child Labor Tax Case, raises.
Sutherland’s analysis fares equally poorly when it turns to
Mrs. Frothingham’s contention that she should be able to block
the transaction as a taxpayer.  His first mistake is to write as
though she were only seeking a refund of her own money by noting
“that the effect of the appropriations complained of will be to in-
crease the burden of future taxation and thereby take her prop-
erty without due process of law.”83  The stress is on the her,
singular.  But her claim is not for a refund, but for injunctive re-
lief.  Nor did William Rawls, Frothingham’s lawyer, make any due
process argument.  Rather he forcibly directed the attention of the
Court to the nineteenth century precedents, such as Crampton v.
Zabriskie that authorized taxpayer suits at the municipal level in
order to prevent ultra vires or illegal actions.  Sutherland’s recast-
ing of the claim is simply a ruse to convert her structural objection
into one about the fate of one lady’s dollars.  It is now easy to
make the transition to the common law tort actions, and to argue
that the moneys could have been lost no matter how they had been
spent, for if this appropriation fails then another might succeed.84
Sutherland’s riposte misses the point of Rawls’s objection on
two counts.  First, as in Crampton the concern is not just for her
dollars, but for the dollars of all persons with whom she has a
81 Id. at 480.
82 Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
83 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486.
84 Id.
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position in common.  In Rawls’s words what was sought was “a
proceeding to be maintained by one of a large class affected by a
law alleged to be invalid, for the purpose of enjoining a public of-
ficer from executing it”,85 citing again Hammer v. Dagenhart.  The
second point is, of course, to enjoin the performance of an illegal
act.  Treating this as a quasi-class action therefore brings the case
within the Crampton principle.  It also increases the size of the
financial stakes substantially, and could easily alter the pattern of
government behavior. Enjoin the payments under this statute,
and the new revenue measure will not replicate the structural
flaws of the one that is overruled.  So whether the taxes are re-
duced, the national debt is trimmed, or new programs are author-
ized, federal power cannot expand whether individual states take
the money or not.
Justice Sutherland never quotes the key passage from
Crampton v. Zabriskie, which holds the plaintiff must be a citizen
or taxpayer of the municipal corporation.  The analogous position
here is that all citizens of the United States and (perhaps) foreign-
ers who pay local taxes may bring suit to enjoin the operation of
the statute, even though foreigners who pay no taxes cannot.  The
real difference of course is that virtually everyone meets the
standing test for suits against the national government even if
only a small fraction of the populace meets it for the local govern-
ment.  But the difference does not matter.  So long as the interests
are fungible, then these interests can be amalgamated without
difficulty.  And if it be said that some citizens support the measure
that is claimed to be ultra vires or illegal, then the same answer
can be given here that is given to suits against municipal corpora-
tions.  Issues of constitutionality and legality are not matters of
majority vote.  Others who disagree on the outcome should be al-
lowed to intervene to defend the decision if the municipal govern-
ment will not, but this option goes not to standing, but to joinder
of necessary parties—a point that did not seem important in Mel-
lon owing to the vigorous defense that the United States made of
its own program.
Yet Sutherland is utterly oblivious to the ease with which the
rules on municipal corporations transfer to the federal level.  In-
stead he purports to distinguish those cases (without examining
them at all) as follows:  “The interest of a taxpayer of a municipal-
ity in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and
the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappro-
priate.”86 But there is nothing to suggest that the right to enjoin
illegal behavior in Crampton depended on the taxpayer being able
85 Id. at 475.
86 Id. at 486.
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to show some minimum level of financial harm.  The words “direct
and immediate” formed no part of its logic, which stressed exactly
the opposite point of view that the taxpayer’s position was one
shared “in common” with other members of the community.  Suth-
erland has clearly suppressed the equitable basis for plaintiff’s ac-
tion, and has adopted, though not in so many words the definition
of standing needed for common law tort actions:
The reasons which support the extension of the equitable rem-
edy to a single taxpayer in such cases are based upon the pecu-
liar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation [he
means municipal corporation] . . ..  IV Dillon Municipal Corpora-
tions, 5th ed., § 1580 et seq.  But the relation of a taxpayer of
the United States to the Federal Government is very different.
His interest in the moneys of the Treasury—partly realized
from taxation and partly from other sources—is shared with
millions of others; is comparative minute and indeterminable;
and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of funds,
so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded
for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity.87
So the courts of equity are out of it.  But he does not explain
why the difference in the number of taxpayers at the federal level
works a difference in principle.  The theory in the municipal case
was that the individual taxpayer was the representative of some
larger group.  That theory can carry over to this case as well.  The
theory further said that all these taxpayers cared both about the
total amount of moneys in question and about enjoining the per-
formance of illegal actions.  Both considerations again apply.  Nor
does it help to describe the matter as one of “public and not of
individual concern,”88 as Sutherland does a moment later, because
it is exactly those kinds of public goods that the equity action was
designed to deal with in the first place.  But once he disposes of
the equity side of the court, he introduces the twin themes of sepa-
ration of powers and the common law tests for direct injury that
have proved so ill-suited to this area:
The functions of government under our system are appor-
tioned.  To the legislative department has been committed the
duty of making laws; to the executive the duty of executing
them; and to the judiciary the duty of interpreting and applying
them in cases properly brought before the courts.  The general
rule is that neither department may invade the province of the
other and neither may control, direct or restrain the action of
the other.89
87 Id. at 487.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 488.
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It all sounds good until we realize that this strong separation-
ist sentiment is flatly inconsistent with judicial review under Mar-
bury v. Madison, for the complaint here is not that the law is
unwise, but that it lies beyond the power of Congress to enact.  Yet
such is the nature of standing that it often leads the justices to
defend the exact opposite opinion, namely, that they should exer-
cise their powers in ways that allow them to duck the responsibil-
ity that Marbury places securely in the judicial branch.  Justice
Sutherland gets to that conclusion in no time:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress
on the ground that they are unconstitutional.  That question
may be considered only when the justification for some direct
injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is
made to rest upon such an act. . . .  The party who invokes the
power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid,
but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sus-
taining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common
with people generally.90
This statement does nothing to repair the conceptual damage
already done.  The use of the term “per se” in the first sentence
allows Sutherland to exploit a profound ambiguity.  That state-
ment is surely correct if it means that the Court cannot on its own
motion examine the statute book and decide that some of its laws
are beyond the power of Congress to enact.  It must decide in re-
sponse to a case, but that only means that a plaintiff has cared
enough to initiate suit, not that he has suffered the direct injury
appropriate for common law actions but irrelevant to the exercise
of the Court’s (indeed any court’s) equitable powers.
B. Reaping the Whirlwind
I have said enough to show that Mellon does not to justice to
the equity portion of the Court’s judicial power under Article III.
But whatever its weaknesses, once we substitute the word “stand-
ing” for the clumsy phrase “justiciable controversy,” Mellon com-
presses the modern case law on standing in a nutshell where it
has since remained.  Once that is done, two problems remain: the
first is to give content to the idea of direct injury, and the second,
more critical issue, is what device allows challenges to structural
changes that harmed no one in particular, but everyone equally.
90 Id. at 488 (emphasis added).  See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 191
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring), for a modern version of the same argument: “The power
recognized in [Marbury] is a potent one.  Its prudent use seems to me incompatible with
unlimited notions of taxpayer and citizen standing.”
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(1) Direct Injury
The question of what counts as a direct injury came up again
15 years after Mellon in Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,91 where the
question was whether a private electrical company had standing
to protest loans and grants made under the National Industrial
Recovery Act to several Alabama municipalities to help defray
their cost of production for a local distribution system.  The Power
Company’s argument was that the grants in question were illegal
in that they gave the local municipalities a leg up in their competi-
tion with the plaintiffs.  To the extent that the suit depended on
taxpayer standing, Justice Sutherland dismissed it on the author-
ity of Massachusetts v. Mellon.  The newer wrinkle in this case
was that the plaintiff sought to complain both as a taxpayer and a
competitor.  In this second capacity, its harm was surely greater
and more distinctive than that of ordinary citizens who benefited
from the improved local power service even if the cutting back of
private services might have inconvenienced them.  Yet at this
point Sutherland translated the direct injury test into the ques-
tion of whether the plaintiff has a valid cause of action, to which
he gave a negative answer:
The term “direct injury” is there [i.e. in Massachusetts v. Mellon]
used in its legal sense, as meaning a wrong which directly re-
sults in the violation of a legal right.  “An injury, legally speak-
ing, consists of a wrong done to a person, or, in other words, a
violation of his right.  It is an ancient maxim, that a damage to
one, without an injury in this sense, (damnum absque injuria),
does not lay a foundation of an action . . . .”92
So the grounds for argument shift, for now it is not the size of
the injury, but whether the competitive harm is compensable as a
matter of common law principles.  There are of course many eco-
nomic harms that fall into this category of noncompensable losses,
but it requires an independent judgment as to whether that result
is sound.  In the usual case of competitive harm, the substantive
judgment is that the gains from competition can be realized only if
each competitor must bear the losses inflicted when some rival of-
fers better goods at lower cost.  But it takes a distinct substantive
leap to conclude that A should be left helpless if B receives illegal
payments from C which count as a subsidy that distort the bal-
ance of trade between the parties.  The subsidy itself, if legal,
might not create this effect: after all, I am allowed to bankroll my
son’s new record store, even if it allows him to undercut the prices
91 302 U.S. 464 (1938).  See Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity, 306 U.S. 118 (1939), where similar issues were raised in this equally unsatisfactory
decision.
92 Id. at 479.
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charged by strangers.  Yet even here, an elaborate dispute exists
at common law as to whether this result holds when a B acts with
malice.93  Surely a similar debate makes sense when illegal or un-
constitutional payments are used to prop up one competitor at the
expense of the other. Perhaps the answer should be that the disap-
pointed competitor has no relief, but it is not because of the want
of causal connection between the subsidy of one competitor and
the financial woes of his rivals. The great vice of the Sutherland
position is that it invokes a familiar legal crutch, “damnum ab-
sque injuria,” to cut off a serious inquiry into the impact of illegal
payments on competitive balance, even for a competitor who has
suffered a disproportionate injury.  The direct injury test has thus
become a charade.  It should be regarded as a good thing that the
more modern cases incorporate elements of the English practice,94
which is to allow a disappointed party to an administrative proce-
dure to maintain an action to attack an award to a competitor,95
on grounds of injury in fact.  The question of whether there is a
valid cause of action still has to be answered, but not in the trun-
cated form that Sutherland adopted.
The confusion over direct injury has also led to a serious con-
fusion in subsequent cases.  Thus in United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),96 environ-
mental groups had challenged the decision by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) not to suspend surcharges imposed on
railroad shipment rates.  The National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA) requires a detailed environmental impact state-
ment in “every recommendation or report on proposals for legisla-
tion and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.”97  In appearances before the
ICC, SCRAP and other environmental groups (such as the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund), had protested that “failure to suspend
the surcharge would cause their members ‘economic, recreational
and aesthetic harm’,” insofar as it interfered with their use of
parks, forests and other natural resources in the Washington D.C.
area.98  The plaintiffs then alleged that they counted as persons
93 See, e.g., Allen v. Flood, [1898] App. Cas. 151; Tuttle v. Buck, 119 N.W. 946 (Minn.
1909).
94 See WADE & FROSYTH, supra note 9, at 702-03.
95 See Association of Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970), for
the liberalization of standing law, not without problems of its own, which also makes refer-
ence to The Administrative Procedure Act to raise “the question whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”
96 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
97 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102 (2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)
(1994).
98 SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 675-76.
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who were “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action”99
under the Data Processing Services’ “injury in fact” test.  In deal-
ing with the standing issue, the Court held that the allegations of
harms to the local environment counted as more than claims of
generalized injury and therefore survived the usual standing chal-
lenges based on the failure to show a special interest.
The Court’s conclusion here seems wrong as a matter of law,
given the tortured chain of causation on which the plaintiffs nec-
essarily relied.  Most obviously, SCRAP did not involve the stan-
dard emissions of pollutants and toxic substances.  Rather, what
the chain of causation envisioned was that the relative increases
in price would lead to a relative increase in the use of nonrecycl-
able goods relative to recyclables, which in turn was said to in-
crease the pressure on the natural resources in forests, streams
and mountains.  The first thing about the case is to wonder why
any environmental group is confident that it knows the direction,
if any, of environmental impacts that would follow from the
changes in rates for a wide range of goods whose responses to
changes in freight rates could be largely uncorrelated.  Nor are the
consequences confined to the single substitution to which the
plaintiff has drawn attention.  Holding back a rate increase could
lead to the reduction in railroad maintenance along the roads
which in turn could increase the number of crashes or spills; or it
could lead to railroad bankruptcies that in turn could result in
major dislocation in transportation markets that cause far more
harm than good.
On this view of the situation, the case should be dismissed,
not because of some standing doctrine, but solely on the grounds
that it does not meet the requirements of either NEPA or the APA.
In light of the multiple directions of the imaginable consequences,
the case is not one where there are federal actions “significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.”  And even if
there were, the uncertainty of their direction dooms any claim
under the APA that the plaintiff is either “adversely affected or
aggrieved” under the APA.  For all we know the rate change could
have had a positive effect on the environment, or a positive effect
in some regions and a negative effect in others—but without any
ability to determine which was which.
Results like this are common in ordinary private cases.  The
issue of causation surfaces in bewildering fashion, for example, in
RICO cases when plaintiffs seek to establish ingenious connec-
tions between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the injury to
plaintiff’s property or business.  In each of these cases, it is under-
99 The Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) provides, “A person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency
action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to have judicial review thereof.”
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stood that the ordinary common law principles of proximate cau-
sation apply, and that these principles allow a court to grant
summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff’s causal
chain is composed of missing links.  Thus in Laborers Local 17
Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.,100 the court explicitly
invoked the language of standing (without any overtones of fed-
eral jurisdiction) when it observed that “the Supreme Court stated
that a plaintiff’s standing to sue under RICO requires ‘a showing
that the defendant’s violation not only was a “but for” cause of his
injury, but was the proximate cause as well.’ ”101
Laborers Local 17 offers a textbook example of applying com-
mon law causation principles.  The plaintiffs had alleged that the
deceptive advertisement campaign of the tobacco companies had
so deceived individual union members that they continued to
smoke to excess, thereby increasing the medical costs to the
health plans of which they were members.  There was no allega-
tion that the fraud had worked an effect on the health plans di-
rectly, but only that, as in SCRAP, the consequences had seeped
through the system, causing “infrastructure harms” to the health
plans for which compensation was required.  No luck, came the
response, a decision that makes explicit reliance on ideas of stand-
ing.  The Court wrote:
It will be virtually impossible for plaintiffs to prove with any
certainty: (1) the effect any smoking cessation programs or in-
centives would have had on the number of smokers among the
plan beneficiaries; (2) the countereffect that the tobacco compa-
nies’ direct fraud would have had on the smokers, despite the
best efforts of the Funds; and (3) other reasons why individual
smokers would continue smoking, even after having been in-
formed of the dangers of smoking and having been offered smok-
ing cessation programs. On a fundamental level, these
difficulties of proving damages stem from the agency of the indi-
vidual smokers in deciding whether, and how frequently, to
smoke. In this light, the direct injury test can be seen as wisely
limiting standing to sue to those situations where the chain of
causation leading to damages is not complicated by the inter-
vening agency of third parties (here, the smokers) from whom
the plaintiffs’ injuries derive.102
This prolonged chain of consequences bears eerie resemblance
to the allegations contained in SCRAP.  To the extent that the
causation issue is relevant, therefore, the summary judgment is
appropriate on nonconstitutional standing grounds.  Indeed, it
seems clear that every case in which a court decides that the
100 191 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1999).
101 Id. at 234 (citing Holmes v. Security Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268
(1992)).
102 Laborers Local, 191 F.3d at 239-40 (emphasis added).
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plaintiff’s injuries are too remote can be treated after a fashion as
one in which the plaintiff is denied standing.  But it would strain
imagination to argue that the determinations of proximate cause
as a matter of tort law shape the constitutional limitations on the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Next it is useful to examine briefly Warth v. Seldin,103 where
plaintiffs, a collection of groups and individuals in the Rochester
area brought suit against the nearby Town of Penfield and mem-
bers of its zoning board, claiming that its illegal policies had ex-
cluded persons of low and median income from living in the town.
The Court held that none of the plaintiffs had standing to main-
tain this “generalized grievance,” and that, further, “the plaintiff
must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his
claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”104
The gist of the complaint was that the behavior of the Town had
blocked the ability of outsiders to purchase property within the
township.  At one level, it is possible to argue, as did Justice Pow-
ell, that none of the plaintiffs could show that they had been ex-
cluded by the restrictions in question.  But the complaint also
alleged that developers and builders had been blocked from build-
ing homes that they, or at least some of their members could af-
ford.  It was not clear who would benefit if the restrictions had
been removed and this inability to trace the connection from a re-
laxation of the zoning restrictions to the new entrants was said to
doom the complaint.
Warth raises two different variations on the causation ques-
tion.  The first issue, which sometimes goes by the name ius tertii,
amounts to a claim that the appropriate parties to challenge the
refusal of the defendants to issue the appropriate permits are the
builders and developers who could apply for them if they chose.105
Justice Powell did not treat this as an absolute bar to standing,
but could easily make it “more difficult” to achieve that claim in
light of the fact that only two developers had sought to obtain
building permits for subsidized housing, when it could not be said
that either of these permits, if awarded, would have resulted in
new housing that the plaintiffs could have purchased.  Putting the
point in this matter raises the question of why these plaintiffs
should be allowed to sue when parties closer to the permit process
have standing to sue on their own behalf.106  The second part of the
103 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
104 Id. at 499.
105 Id. at 504 (“[P]etitioners claim that respondents’ enforcement of the ordinance
against third parties—developers, builders, and the like—has had the consequence of pre-
cluding the construction of housing suitable to their needs at prices they might be able to
afford.”).
106 See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(upholding restrictive zoning against an equal protection challenge).
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question simply treats the uncertain role of the builders and de-
velopers as but additional reason why “the facts alleged fail to
support an actionable causal relationship between Penfield’s zon-
ing practices and petitioner’s asserted injury.”
As to the first point, the developers and builders might not
have sued because they could not see the financial profit in taking
on a local government that is determined to fight zoning issues for
the long haul.  Indeed, it was only the use of third party plaintiffs
similar to the plaintiffs that brought to a head New Jersey’s inter-
minable litigation in the Mount Laurel cases.107  The situation
thus looks like one in which the immediate parties who are
harmed will not take up the cudgels, so why cut out parties in the
next outer ring from federal courts categorically on constitutional
grounds, even when racial discrimination does not count as an ele-
ment in the case?  The better response is one that allows for an
amalgamation of cases that raise common challenges so that they
can be disposed of in a unified proceeding.
Likewise, Warth is mistaken even if it is treated as just an-
other application of the tort rules of proximate cause to the consti-
tutional doctrine of standing.  Unlike SCRAP (and Laborers Local
17), the exclusion of developers, who would sell to members of the
plaintiff class, was not some debatable consequence of an action
undertaken with reference to some other objective.  Justice Powell
misses the point that this case looks like an intentional interfer-
ence (by legal force) with prospective advantage cases in which it
is held that the schoolmaster or the trader was allowed a suit even
though the guns were deliberately trained on his prospective
pupils or trading partners.108  And like those cases, the conse-
quences at issue here were those that the zoning board (whose
business is exclusion) manifestly intended.
The difference between the earlier common law cases and
Warth is that it is not possible to identify with certainty which
individuals were the victims of the defendant’s conduct.  But
again the point does not require the invocation of any special doc-
trine of standing.  Rather, now the case looks like a variation on
the market share rule of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,109 where
the question before the court is what should be done when it is
known with certainty that some members of the plaintiffs class
have been harmed, in that case by their mother’s ingestion of
DES, but it cannot be determined which.  The key insight of the
107 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J.
1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
See John M. Payne, Rethinking Fair Share: The Judicial Enforcement of Affordable Hous-
ing Policies, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 20 (1987), for an account of the above noted cases.
108 See, supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
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market share rule is that the amalgamation of individual claims
is the most sensible technique to overcome the weaknesses that
each individual plaintiff has in making out her case on the issue of
causation in fact.110  Thus it would lead to massive underdeter-
rence if each of 100 plaintiffs were sent home empty-handed be-
cause the probability that her individual injuries were caused by
the defendant was only 40 percent.  Here it becomes hard to deny
that the restrictive zoning practices did not keep out some plain-
tiffs; so long as the appropriate class contains some of the obvious
victims, then they should be allowed to sue as a group if the direct
injury test is appropriate.111  But in Warth, as in SCRAP, the rem-
edy sought was a lifting of the injunctive relief.
Finally, the element of direct causation of harm took on a
somewhat weird coloration in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,112 in
which the substantive question before the Court was whether the
Secretary of the Interior had properly interpreted section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act which required that federal agencies un-
dertaking or funding projects should first consult with the Secre-
tary of the Interior to determine that their projects do not
jeopardize endangered or threatened species.113  The Interior De-
partment promulgated a rule stating that this requirement ap-
plied only to actions done within the United States or on the high
seas, but not within foreign countries.  It is hard to imagine a bet-
ter organization to challenge the administrative rendering of the
ESA, given its long-term commitments.  But since prior Supreme
Court law blocked this route, the inquiry turned to the question of
whether two members of the Defenders could show a sufficient
nexus by pleading that they had seen some protected species over-
seas and wished at some indefinite time to travel abroad to see
them again.  Justice Scalia conceded that “the desire to use or ob-
serve an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is un-
deniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing,”114 but
balked at allowing a generalized “animal nexus” theory when
neither plaintiff had to demonstrate distinct plans to go overseas
to the area in which the threatened species lived. Why then bother
110 See Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REV. 963 (1978).
111 See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 117 (1987).
112 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
113 See Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary [of the Interior], insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried
out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary, after
consultation as appropriate with affected States, to be critical.
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)(1988).
114 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562-63.
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with the requirement at all?  The travel plans of any given plain-
tiff make no discernible difference in terms of the ostensible poli-
cies behind the standing requirement.  The issue under dispute
has nothing to do with investigating animals and everything to do
with statutory interpretation and administrative law.  The animal
nexus plaintiff is no better or no worse to push those claims than
the direct observer.  The suit is tailor made for the equity side of
the standing doctrine.  I shall discuss those considerations as part
of a more detailed consideration of structured injunctions.
C. Structural Injunctions
We are now in position to examine the major confusions of the
standing question, which relates to its use in obtaining equitable
relief against illegal action.  The relationship between standing
and the spending clause first raised in Mellon resurfaced again
forty-five years after Frothingham in Flast v. Cohen.115 The Court
switched gears by allowing a taxpayer suit to challenge federal aid
to religious education under the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965.  The specific ground for the challenge was that
the establishment clause of the First Amendment limited the
power of Congress to spend for the general welfare.  In a real
sense the case looks like a rerun of Mellon, but the plaintiff
emerged victorious for reasons whose unintelligibility defies brief
summarization.  Thus Chief Justice Warren wrote:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it.
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that
status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a
taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality
only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and
spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution.  It will not be
sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the
administration of an essentially regulatory statute. . . .  Sec-
ondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement al-
leged.  Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that
the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limita-
tions imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally
beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.116
The Court then held that these conditions were satisfied for
reasons that bear no relationship to this obscure excursus into log-
ical links, nexus and incidental expenditures:  “Our history vividly
illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who
drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was
115 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
116 Id. at 102-03.
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that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one
religion over another or to support religion in general.”117  Yet
what is true of the establishment clause in relation to the general
welfare clause is surely true of expenditures in violation of general
welfare clause alone: special payments presage illicit redistribu-
tions of wealth.118  The great vice of the Maternity Act was at least
as bad, perhaps worse, because it involved both the risk of wealth
distribution across states—surely a larger concern in 1787 than in
1923—and the alteration of the balance between state and federal
power through the aggressive use of the combined power to tax
and to spend.  It is an odd use of constitutional history to identify
the structural reasons for one clause of the document and to ig-
nore the parallel arguments elsewhere.
What makes the Flast episode so curious is that its labored
rationale had no legs.  Thus in Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United Against Church & State119, the Defense Depart-
ment gave away excess property to Valley Forge for free, after de-
ciding to reduce its fair valuation by 100 percent to take into
account the public benefit that inured from the transfer.  The
plaintiff group, committed to the separation of church and state,
relied on taxpayer standing to block the transfer.  The obvious
ground for protest was that the individual transfer violated the
establishment clause by turning public property into religious use,
the level of subsidy here is as great as if the Defense Department
gave the College a sum of money equal to the value of the land,
which it then used to purchase it.  Nonetheless, Flast was held not
117 Id. at 103.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, 444 (1990), for a defense of Flast in these terms (noting that a
difference might exist between those violations of the spending clause that offend a specific
guarantee of the Bill of Rights and those which simply lie outside the scope of Congress).
But again the distinction makes no difference: standing goes to the plaintiff’s stake, which
does not get any larger when two constitutional provisions are implicated instead of one.
118 For an effort to resurrect the “general welfare” language as a real limitation on the
government power, see John Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare
Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001). The position has some real intellectual support. No one
doubts that the word “common defense” operates as some kind of limitation on the power to
tax and spend.  Why then assume that the phrase “general welfare” was meant to be com-
pendious, given that it would render the “common defense” language wholly redundant.
Rather, a more sensible approach is that the two terms should be read in pari marteria as
an effort to limit government expenditures to classical public goods, i.e. those in which it is
impossible to exclude benefits from A when they are given to B.  Here it would be too re-
strictive to read that language to say that expenditures must benefit everyone if they are to
benefit anyone: that would also make hash of spending for the defense of the West Coast
and not for the East Coast.  But it does treat the general welfare as covering those expendi-
tures that are intended to apply, under uniform standards to public goods that are nonex-
cludable with respect to some large fraction of the population.  And it certainly allows
expenditures that are made for one segment of the population under programs that have
application across the board.  What it rules out are programs of income redistribution for
particular individuals, where the cash or in kind benefits have no classical public goods
qualities.
119 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
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to apply because this particular executive action had taken place
pursuant to Congress’s power to dispose of excess property under
Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 the property clause—“The Congress shall have
[the] Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regula-
tions respective the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States”, and therefore was not an general appropriation of
funds under the spending clause.  The point had a certain element
of deja vu because in the oral argument in Mellon the ever-re-
sourceful Attorney Rawls had sought to defend the expenditures
under the Maternity Act as disposition of excess property under
this clause.120  But the deeper problem is, why should a violation of
the establishment clause trigger standing in the one case and not
the other, when the risk of faction may, if anything be greater
with a specific appropriation than it is with a general rule?
No real answer was given to that question.  Instead Justice
Rehnquist quickly shifted the discussion back to the general prin-
ciples governing standing, and noted that the plaintiff had not
identified any personal injury beyond the psychological harm of
being forced to watch a violation of the Constitution, which hardly
distinguishes the case from Flast.  Thereafter he went on to give a
convenient modern rationalization for the rule that was more com-
plete, but no more persuasive than that offered by Justice Suther-
land in Mellon for his rejection of the basic equity model defended
above.  Thus Justice Rehnquist argued that the direct injury re-
quirement “tends to assure that the legal questions presented to
the court will be resolved, not in the rarefied atmosphere of a de-
bating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a re-
alistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”  This
point sounds bizarre in connection with the elaborate arguments
which could not have been, but were in fact offered in both Mellon
and Valley Forge.  The arguments there were fully and adequately
made on both sides of the case; no one after the fact has been able
to identify a single consideration that was omitted from either dis-
cussion that could have been supplied by a more detailed opera-
tion of the Maternity Act on the one hand, or the disposition of
surplus property on the other.
Indeed, quite the opposite is true. The legal issues presented
in Mellon rendered adequacies or inadequacies of the federal or
state practices, the number of states that signed up, and its bene-
fits programs utterly irrelevant to the facial constitutional chal-
lenge raised against the statute.  Likewise the outright gift of
public property to a religious organization raises a clear constitu-
tional question, whether that facility is used for classrooms or dor-
120 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 446 (1923).  The argument was money
counted as property under the clause, which seems preposterous in light of the overall
structure of the clause and the constitution.
\\Server03\productn\C\CHP\4-1\CHP107.txt unknown Seq: 47 24-APR-01 17:01
2001] Standing and Spending 47
mitories.  It is as though the taxpayer suit in Crampton should
have been turned aside on the ground that no taxpayer could com-
ment intelligently on the quality of brick and mortar specified to
be used in the construction of the proposed hospital facility.  What
stands out in both Mellon and Valley Forge is that the ineligible
plaintiffs raised sensible per se, facial constitutional challenges
that they were well able to litigate.  The point is especially true in
light of the alternative: there is no obvious second tier candidate
in Mellon, and the only person who might have standing in a Flast
like situation under the direct injury test would be the disap-
pointed second bidder, if any, who could hardly be expected to
wage a major legal war to save a few dollars.
As is evident from the nonrandom selection of plaintiffs in
both cases, it is manifestly wrong to assume that a direct injury
correlates even weakly with the incentives needed to articulate
the relevant issues in a protracted legal struggle.  Parties surely
know their own interests, whether they are financial, intellectual
or political.  They can decide by themselves what level of resources
that they wish to spend in what kind of situation.  Indeed it is
likely that the ideological plaintiffs, both of the left or the right,
will address the issues of principle raised in litigation precisely
because they care as much about the structure of American gov-
ernment independent of the impact on their own pocketbooks.  To
the extent that standing issues are entwined with financial con-
cerns, these equitable actions against the government designed to
validate a common interest are no different in form or substantive
from the garden variety class action or derivative suits routinely
brought against private defendants.  The great risk with multi-
party litigation is not excessive intervention by strangers but the
free-rider problem, whereby parties who cannot secure sufficient
funding will let the case pass because the benefits are obtained by
outsiders.  That objection rings false as a description of the moti-
vation of ideological parties of all persuasions.  It is not that they
will turn money down; but they will often litigate on issues know-
ing that the prospect of a financial return is negligible.  But even
for those litigants who are in it for the money, a standing doctrine
is crude beyond belief as a means to sort out the go-getters from
the slackers.
What really matters in these cases are the incentives and
payoffs that govern these suits.  As in ordinary derivative actions,
the appropriate inquiries should be directed towards methods of
compensation, or about rules used to prevent abuse of process:
does the successful plaintiff receive a lien on the proceeds of recov-
ery, or a payment from the corporation benefited by its work?
Should the plaintiff be subject to penalties for losing? For bringing
frivolous suits?  To answer these questions, we need rules that
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regulate class actions, intervention, joinder, fee awards, and res
judicata.  The standing requirement as such addresses none of
these issues.
Finally, the tort-based standing requirement is not advanced
by the observation that the federal courts are not places for con-
cerned bystanders to ventilate their dissatisfaction with govern-
ment programs, or that courts should not be converted into
“judicial versions of college debating societies.”  All litigation re-
sembles a debating society given the clash of wills.  But litigation
is serious business for these parties whether or not they are said
to have standing.  The plaintiffs who bring these suits are asking
to enjoin some activities and to require others.  The courts will
only be reduced to the level of debating societies if they announce
in advance that they will not on principle supply any relief to the
parties before it.  But reverse the standing rules, and the litiga-
tion can proceed to its necessary conclusion.  The standard deriva-
tive action brought against municipal corporations does not
reduce state courts to cheering societies.  Parallel actions against
the federal government will have no different effects.
The bypass of constitutional adjudication under Mellon has
been invoked in other structural situations as well. Thus in
Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War,121 the plaintiffs, present
and former members of the reserves, claimed that the compatibil-
ity clause, which provides that “no Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House dur-
ing his Continuance in Office,” was violated when several mem-
bers of Congress held commissions in the reserves.  The structural
elements of the case were systematically disregarded with the ob-
servation that the members of the plaintiff organization had no
greater stake in this issue than any other citizen.  So a constitu-
tional issue is deflected from the courts, without any obvious ex-
planation as to how it might otherwise be resolved.
In a similar vein, the companion case, United States v. Rich-
ardson,122 refused to allow the plaintiffs to attack the secrecy sur-
rounding the appropriations to the Central Intelligence Agency on
the grounds that it violated Art. I, § 9, cl. 7, which provides that “a
regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money shall be published from time to time.”
Whether that section is subject to a sensible exception for expendi-
tures whose publication could give aid and comfort to the enemy,
is not my concern here: the suit could easily be defeated on the
ground that the explicit command of this clause is defeated by an
implied exception narrowly tailored to the occasion.  But the
121 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
122 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
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Court, after repeating the observation that the loss in question
was “common to all members of the public,”—and hence suitable
for equitable relief, held that the issue was one that should be
rightly considered by the representative branches of government
as a political question.  One might as well say that all shareholder
derivative suits should never be allowed because minority share-
holders are free to lobby the board of directors and their fellow
shareholders.  Once again the partial rejection of Marbury follows
as a matter of course.
Finally, the Court’s neglect of the equity side of standing bars
the articulation of a coherent approach to the structural issues
raised by the voting cases.  Today we have gone past Ashby v.
White, and now must routinely confront situations far more diffi-
cult than those involving simple exclusion of lawful voters from
the polls. Since Baker v. Carr123 the Court has had to face a non-
stop set of cases dealing with both the size and the shape of dis-
tricts for federal and state office.124  In each and every instant,
what is at stake is what individuals should be grouped together in
what district and for what reason.  No matter what the source of
the grievance—unequal numbers, illicit racial grouping—a deci-
sion to draw the lines in one way has consequences both for the
people included within a district and for those who are, for better
or for worse, shipped off to some other district.  Some citizens
could be upset at being excluded from certain districts or included
in others.  Or they could be upset at the people who are added in,
or taken away from them.  But all the grievances are about the
overall shape of the electoral distribution, not about the value of
the individual vote.  To treat district line-drawing as involving
some discrete injury to any particular voter is a hopeless and arti-
ficial refinement that bears no relationship to any constitutional
or statutory challenges to the legality of the action.  There is no
credible way in which some ostensible personal injury is linked to
the ability to raise sustained and principled challenges to the
knotty substantive issues that have to be resolved once the stand-
ing hurdle has been overcome.
In light of these issues, the Supreme Court should have
adopted a rule that allows any aggrieved voter within his or her
state to challenge the plan.  Yet in United States v. Hays,125 the
Court, speaking through Justice O’Connor, recited the standard
litany of cases (including Lujan and Valley Forge) to insist that an
aggrieved citizen show the appropriate direct and immediate in-
123  369 U.S. 186 (1962).
124 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (holding that irrational voting schemes
could be challenged on equal protection grounds when they could only be understood as an
effort, without justification, to segregate individuals on the ground of race).
125 515 U.S. 737 (1995).
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terest to maintain the challenge.  The Court concluded that any
individual (no matter of what race) who lives within a district has
standing to challenge its outcome, even though citizens outside
the district (who might claim to be properly within it) do not.126
The ostensible rationale for this conclusion is that those within
the district suffer “special representational harms”, while those
outside do not.  The term “special” was invoked to make it appear
that the voting cases fall within the rule first set out in Mellon,
but the term loses all its bite given that the one plaintiff within a
district shares his position in common with all others within that
district.  That veral legerdemain is wholly unnecessary, for a sim-
ple switch to the equitable model of standing, taking into account
the interdependence in the composition of all districts makes it
clear that there is only one proper conclusion in these cases.  Any-
one who lives within the state can sue to protest the composition
of the district in which he is included or from which he is excluded.
The further refinements simply do not matter.  Thus it seems to
be a mistake to argue, as John Ely does, that standing should be
limited to individuals who are racial minorities in the district in
which they are located.127  And it tends to support, on somewhat
different grounds, the conclusion of Samuel Issacharoff and
Pamela Karlan that all individuals have standing to protest the
outcome.  They reach this conclusion on the strength of an “ex-
pressive, noninstrumental” policy that is triggered to a substan-
tive theory of equal protection that sees race as irrelevant to the
districting process.128  But that view ties the issue of standing too
closely to a controversial theory of substantive relief.  The simpler,
more general, and more cogent explanation for system wide voter
standing is that the equitable side of the judicial power is de-
signed to deal with any and all sorts of amalgamated claims that
one individual has in common with others.
III. COMPLICATIONS OF THE EQUITABLE METHOD
The major flaw that originated in Mellon, and survives to this
date, is to treat taxpayer and citizen suits for equitable relief as
126 Id. at 745.  For learned attacks on this decision see John Hart Ely, Standing to
Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders, 111 HARV. L. REV. 576 (1997), and Samuel Is-
sacharoff & Pamela Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2276 (1998).  Given what I have written above, it seems a mistake to try to find
some linkage between the subset of voters who have standing and the substantive theory
on which they wish to proceed.  Ely’s restrictive position on standing—that only individuals
who are members of racial minorities in their particular districts have standing—seems a
clear mistake.  Issacharoff and Karlan seem much closer to the mark when, invoking “ex-
pressive” theories of injury.
127 See Ely, supra note 126, at 594.
128 See Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 126, at 2286. “When the government uses race
to assign some voters to District X, it tells all voters that race matters.” Id. (emphasis
added).
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beyond the judicial power under Article III.  The counter-argu-
ment is that the standing requirement is not the appropriate way
to deal with the adjustments that take place when plaintiffs bring
either class actions or suits in which they purport to represent the
interests that all citizens and taxpayers hold in common.  The cen-
tral point is that amalgamation of individual claims is both possi-
ble and necessary only where these claims are largely fungible
with each other.  It is one thing; however, to invoke the principle
of equitable jurisdiction, and quite another to ignore those princi-
ples insofar as they relate to the conduct of complex litigation once
the plaintiffs seek some structural relief.
To complete the overall picture of a revised standing doctrine,
therefore, it becomes imperative to show how the traditional limi-
tations on the use of equitable jurisdiction should influence the
treatment of a wide range of cases that are at present wrongly
excluded under the standing requirement.  In particular three
general issues present themselves for discussion.  The first is the
question of whether a plaintiff’s action should be dismissed on the
ground that some necessary parties to the litigation have not been
joined in the suit.  The second question is whether the traditional
limitations on the awards of equitable remedies should be
respected once the standing obstacles have been overcome. The
third question is whether any purported limitations imposed by
the standing requirement can be negated by a congressional deter-
mination that certain citizens groups should be afforded standing
to sue.
A. Who are necessary parties to litigation?
It is a common premise of the current debates over standing
that the case and controversy language of Article III makes it in-
appropriate for any party to ask the court for an advisory opinion.
No matter whether the case rests on legal or equitable principles,
at the very least a case or controversy involves a clash between
two adverse parties before the Court.  A close cousin to the advi-
sory opinion is in practice the collusive lawsuit in which the plain-
tiff sues the defendant to enjoin a practice that both parties regard
as illegal.129  It is quite clear that these collusive lawsuits present
the train of abuses that must be taken into account in suits that
seek equitable as well as legal relief.  The question then arises:
what should be done about the problem?  Here there are two possi-
ble courses of action.  The first is to dismiss the action on the
ground that it simply represents an effort by two parties, not one,
to obtain an advisory opinion.  The second is to join to the lawsuit
129 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (government intervened in a
suit brought by a shareholder against his corporation).
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a party whose interest is indeed opposed to both parties to the
collusive action.  The interjection of the third party into the suit—
the choice of procedural device does not matter for these pur-
poses—removes the danger that phony litigation will determine
the course of American law.130
Matters become more difficult when it is not quite clear
whether a lawsuit is collusive or not.  That situation can easily
arise when two unrelated parties engage in litigation whose main
concern is the relationship that one party to the transaction has to
an unrelated party.  It could easily be that the party sued is quite
happy, even eager to see its legal relations with third persons al-
tered; or it could be reluctant to see them altered, but not keen on
expending the resources needed to keep that relationship alive.
The question then arises as to what should be done when it is not
known if the initial lawsuit is collusive, but where there is a par-
tial alignment between the interests of the litigants and imperfect
alignment with the interests of third parties.  This issue gets sys-
tematically suppressed in those cases in which the standing re-
quirement is invoked to block suits.  But it comes to the fore once
the standing is accorded to representative plaintiffs in accordance
with traditional equitable criteria.
One early case that raised this problem was Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority,131 where the question before the Court
was whether holders of voting preferred stock could sue to enjoin
the Alabama Power Company from entering into a contract that
called for a sale of assets to the TVA.  The objection was that the
contract was illegal because the establishment of the TVA was it-
self unconstitutional.  Chief Justice Hughes found that sharehold-
ers had standing to pursue the suit against the corporation on
grounds of its illegality, and also that the Power Company had in
fact defended its right to enter into the contracts.  But the entire
difficulty on the question was obviated by the joinder of the TVA
as a defender in the case, so that it could step up its activities in
the event that the Power Company decided to plead its own cause
faintly.  But if TVA had not been joined, then it might well have
been perfectly appropriate to dismiss the case on the ground that
the lawsuit could do untold mischief to the status of an absent
party.  Standing, as it were, becomes a doctrine that is used to
weed out cases brought not by the wrong plaintiff, but against the
wrong defendant.
That same theme carries over into more modern cases.  One of
the leading exemplars of modern standing law is Allen v.
130 A similar technique is often used in mass torts/products liability cases to prevent
removal to federal court.
131 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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Wright,132 in which the parents of black public students enrolled in
districts undergoing desegregation sued to require the IRS to
stiffen the standards that allowed federal tax-exemptions to pri-
vate schools operating within these districts, which the plaintiffs
claimed had adopted racially discriminatory topics.  The suit was
dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing, given
that the only injuries that they reported individually were that
blacks were “stigmatized” by their inability to attend these private
schools, and the private schools within the district necessarily de-
nied their children the right to attend an integrated school.  The
former obviously does not show a particularized injury, and the
second depends on elaborate predictions as to what would happen
within the district if the tax exemptions were removed, so that
Justice O’Connor had little trouble in deciding that the usual tort-
like requirements for standing were not satisfied.
Viewed from the perspective taken here, any citizen or tax-
payer should have standing to challenge this tax exemption.  That
said, the action still should have been dismissed because none of
the local schools whose tax-exemptions were at risk was joined as
a party defendant to the case.  Here of course, presumably, they
would have an opportunity to protest after the fact any IRS deci-
sion targeted to them.  But if the matter is ripe for litigation from
the point of view of the plaintiffs, then it is ripe from the point of
view of the defendants.  The IRS, moreover, has a long history of
equivocation, especially in connection with Bob Jones University,
on whether these tax exemptions are properly granted, so it could
not be relied upon to defend this lawsuit with the same vigor as
the named schools.  Once these defendants are introduced, the re-
sistance to the claim is likely to be far more stout, which is again
as it should be.  And if it turns out that the entire matter becomes
one too complex for litigation, then the suit could be dismissed on
that ground, at least if some administrative remedy were made
available to the plaintiffs—provided that the defendants had at
least some opportunity to appear in proceedings directed against
them.  The individualized tort grievance rarely presents the issues
of collateral import that are routine occurrences in equitable
cases.
A similar analysis applies to Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization.133 The Internal Revenue Service had is-
sued a ruling that treated as charitable tax-exempt corporations
several nonprofit hospitals that had supplied only limited emer-
gency services to indigent patients.  Justice Powell denied the re-
lief chiefly on the ground that it was not possible to trace the
132 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
133 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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causal connection between the hospital’s favorable tax treatment
and the services that it rendered.  It could well be that the hospi-
tals would decide to pursue for-profit patients more vigorously if
they lost their tax-exempt status.  Justice Brennan’s dissent did
not dispute the conceptual framework for evaluating standing
cases, but thought that the “opportunity and ability” to obtain
treatment counted as a particularized grievance, even though no
particular refusal of service had been shown.
Within the tort-side of the standing doctrine, the hard ques-
tion is how special is special enough.  From the perspective of eq-
uitable remedies though, any taxpayer should have standing to
enjoin the exemption, but once again the question is whether it
can do so with only the IRS on the opposite side.  Here again the
risks of collusive pressures are evident, so that at the very least
notice and an opportunity to intervene should be granted to the
nonprofit hospitals whose exemptions were at issue.  However,
that procedural response is not an argument for the imposition of
a standing requirement but rather for a requirement of the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, in which the IRS first inves-
tigates any complaint filed, after giving the challenged parties a
chance to respond administratively to the charges that have been
lost.  And if the complaints are frivolous, or intended to harass,
then monetary sanctions might be used to curb the abuse.  The
precise details on procedure cannot be decided on in the abstract.
But it surely makes far more sense to lay bare the choices about
third party practice rather than to enjoin the suit solely by refer-
ence to the plaintiff’s taxpayer status, given the evident risk of
over-inclusion.
The same concern about parties was in fact raised in Lujan, in
connection with the question of redressibility.  The nub of the Sec-
retary’s position was that plaintiff could not get (what equity
courts used to call) comprehensive relief against the Secretary.
The statutory provision required that other federal agencies con-
sult with the Secretary to insure that actions they fund or execute
comply with the statute.  But these agencies were not joined in the
suit.  But to say this is to invoke the standing doctrine to deal with
a joinder of parties issue on the defendant’s side.  Again a court is
faced with hard choices.  One approach is to limit the relief to a
specific project so that the correct Federal agencies can be joined.
That hardly seems appropriate in this context until it is deter-
mined whether the ESA has effect in foreign countries.  On that
issue, it seems perfectly proper to allow this plaintiff to seek lim-
ited relief without the joinder of additional parties simply by liti-
gating the question of foreign coverage against the Secretary,
where the equitable relief requested is not the review of a particu-
lar project, but the emendation of the regulations to reflect the
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proper interpretation of the statute.  The great vice of the current
law is that it lumps together the distinct question of who may sue
with the question of who must be sued, when the choice of proper
defendants depends on the nature of the relief that plaintiff seeks.
If that suit proves successful, then in some future case it is open to
the Defenders, or indeed any other citizen or taxpayer, to join both
the Secretary and the particular agency to see whether some addi-
tional relief is requested—which raises questions of discretionary
nature of equitable remedies, to which I now turn.
B. Discretionary Remedies
The next major issue with equitable remedies is whether they
issue as of right or at the discretion of the court.  As one might
expect, the first cut to this problem takes into account the nature
of the underlying claims.  The more the dispute looks like a two-
person dispute over a short period of time, the easier it is to think
that equitable remedies should be a matter of right.  Thus if the
question is whether the plaintiff should be allowed to enjoin a sub-
stantial nuisance, the answer to that question could easily be yes,
even though some authority allows the court to balance the hard-
ships when the defendant’s use is highly valuable, and the plain-
tiff’s of only minor worth.134  With specific performance in land
sale contracts, the presumptive rule is that the remedy is awarded
as of right, at least where the rights of third parties do not inter-
vene.135  In the first case, the legal objective is relatively straight-
forward, which is to shut down the wrongful acts of an identified
stranger.  In the second, the order for specific performance can be
issued without requiring the court to superintend some ongoing
and disputatious relationship.  Once the title to the land is trans-
ferred, then nothing remains for either party to do.
Matters do not always remain this simple.  Equitable relief in
land conveyances and nuisances can easily become complicated,
for example when third party rights intervene.  The equitable
remedy of specific performance is systematically excluded in em-
ployment contracts, absent a statutory violation, because it places
too much of a burden on courts to superintend questions of
whether the employee has slacked off on the job, or the employer
has increased his demands on the employee.  Yet by the same to-
ken, courts have been willing to issue an injunction that prevents
an employee in breach from working for a competitor, for equity
courts can easily ensure that this injunction is observed.
134 For some of the complications, see Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870
(N.Y. 1970); Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
135 See Anthony Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 355-64 (1978).
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The permissible use of equitable remedies is also tested in the
context of derivative suits and reorganizations.  One reason why
the traditional rules focused on enjoining illegal actions is that
this remedy looks so clean. But matters take on a different view
when courts have to issue supervisory orders to the corporate di-
rectors or trustees in reorganizations, which are difficult to formu-
late in advance, and to evaluate thereafter.  This broad set of
equitable principles surely carries over to the judicial power in eq-
uity as it exists under Article III.  It should be relatively easy to
order courts to perform specific acts or to refrain from illegal ones.
But it is far more difficult for courts to require that administrative
parties undertake complex actions that require the appropriation
of funds or require the cooperation of particular officials.  Of
course, no fixed rule prohibits courts from entering that thicket
should the occasion require it.  But surely there are many occa-
sions in which courts should refrain from getting involved in
problems that they cannot supervise.  This asymmetry in reme-
dies creates an obvious tension; it is easier for a target of regula-
tion to resist claims that it should be subject to illegal commands
then it is for outsiders to insist on the performance of certain
actions.
These questions could be lumped together with all the other
issues raised under the single banner of standing, but disaggrega-
tion often leads to a better understanding of why it may well have
been correct for courts to decline to exercise their equitable juris-
diction.  For example, it seems clear that the Supreme Court
should not have declined to exercise its equitable jurisdiction in
Alabama Power.  If the subsidies supplied by the United States
are illegal, then it is simple enough to enjoin their payment.  It
does not matter for these purposes whether the illegal act took the
form of sanctions or subsidy.  In the former case the action lies
with the target or regulation; in the latter it lies with the disap-
pointed competitor of the firm that received the illegal subsidy.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that no court in exercise of
its equitable jurisdiction should take it upon itself to suspend the
rate increase in SCRAP at the request of the plaintiff.  To be sure,
the Supreme Court sidestepped this question in SCRAP when it
held that the Interstate Commerce Act precluded any court from
enjoining an ICC order.136  But it seems clear that the preliminary
injunction should not issue even if the ICA contained no statutory
bar.  The connection between the asserted ICC conduct and the
global injury claimed was far from clear; and any rate rollback
would have dramatic consequences on all sorts of third parties,
136 See Interstate Commerce Act § 15(7), 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1964), as construed in, Ar-
row Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
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including a full range of shippers and carriers, and perhaps other
environmental groups, that did not see the same causal connec-
tion as in SCRAP.  The case is one where damages are, to say the
least, speculative so that the most that could be done would be to
ask whether the ICC had taken into account SCRAP’s views in the
course of its own deliberations, which of course it had.
The problem of discretion in remedies surfaces again with
Warth v. Seldin, for it is an open question of what relief might be
granted once it is assumed that the plaintiff’s have standing to
pursue their claims.  To answer that question, it becomes neces-
sary to first explore the substantive theory of relief that plaintiff’s
pursue—for example, is it an equal protection claim or a due pro-
cess claim.  Only after one knows what portions of the local zoning
ordinance is found defective, and for what reason, does it become
possible to decide what relief, if any, should be ordered.  At this
stage the fact that plaintiffs have not claimed that any specific
project has been excluded, renders it impossible to order relief
that allows the construction to go ahead subject to only those zon-
ing restrictions that survive constitutional challenge.  At this
point, therefore, the nebulous nature of the plaintiff’s claim comes
back to haunt the overall suit.  To be sure, it might be possible to
give some limited relief to the extent that some portions of the
local regulations are shown to be per se unconstitutional.  But at
this point, the case does not offer enough information about the
nature of the claimed violation to support intelligent judgments
about the appropriate form of relief.  But this insufficiency should
not be regarded as a backhanded justification for denying the suit
in the first place.  Once the standing issue is resolved in favor of
these plaintiffs on a class basis, then the substantive development
of the suit should give sufficient indication as to the permissible
scope of relief.  The vice in Warth is the premature truncation of
the lawsuit.  It is not some defect in the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction.
A similar analysis of the matter applies to Lujan, or more ac-
curately, any subsequent suit that challenges the adequacy of the
Secretary of Interior’s administration of the program if it is de-
cided that the ESA reaches projects funded or carried out in for-
eign countries.  At this stage, it seems possible to entertain suits
that require the Secretary to order his office to apply the same
standards of review to projects in foreign nations as he does to
domestic projects or to those on the high seas.  That judgment in
effect states that the Secretary could not apply its budget authori-
zation process exclusively to domestic projects.  But it is an open
question as to how much further the judicial supervision can go.
It may well be more difficult to scrutinize projects that take place
overseas; or more difficult to implement American guidelines for
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projects that have to meet local requirements that could easily be
inconsistent with our own.  At some point, it looks as though the
budget allocations and the administrative determinations will be
shot through with the types of discretion that no court of equity
can sensibly second guess.  And it could easily turn out that these
problems are more acute in foreign projects than in domestic ones.
If that is the case, then at some point, the concerns of redres-
sibility, rightly isolated, could lead a decision to refuse to grant
equitable relief.  But it takes a very different inquiry from the one
offered by Justice Scalia who concentrated solely on the one fea-
ture that does not matter at all—the travel plans of this plaintiff.
The same issue of relief and discretion was similarly raised in
Linda R.S. v. Richard D.137 In that case, Texas law made it a mis-
demeanor for any parent to willfully desert, neglect or refuse to
support or maintain a child under 18.138  On its face the statute
did not distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate children,
and plaintiff’s class action alleged that Texas Courts had wrong-
fully invoked the law only to the parents of legitimate and not ille-
gitimate children.  Here again it is important to disentangle the
question of whether the plaintiff has standing to present the case
from the question of whether a court of equity could award a sen-
sible remedy.  On the first issue, Justice Marshall took the posi-
tion that the claim of injury was “speculative,” that the chain of
causation was not long enough to reach this case:  “if the appellant
were granted the requested relief, it would result only in the jail-
ing of the child’s father.”139  It hardly follows, however, that this
plaintiff needs for the prosecutor to act in her individual case in
order to gain from a change in the legal rules.  The threat of a
possible suit has for her only an upside and no private downside,
so it takes no great imagination to believe that she is better off if it
is brought, if only because she could use it as a lever to negotiate a
settlement that could then be enforced on ordinary contract
grounds.  As only individuals in need of support and maintenance
are in this position, it appears as though the traditional standing
requirement is met, assuming it is relevant.
But the second problem is more difficult to deal with: should
the Court issue any equitable relief at all?  The nub of difficulty
here is that prosecutors have to husband their resources in order
to decide which actions should be brought, and which not.  The
objection looks to be decisive against any individual lawsuit that
claims that the prosecutors should have moved in one particular
instance.  It would simply be an intolerable intrusion on the oper-
137 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
138 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.05 (West 1989) (discussed in Linda R.S. as Art. 602 of
the Texas Penal Code).
139 Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618.
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ation of a prosecutor’s office to let the squeaky wheel get all the
grease.  But this was a class action lawsuit, which claimed that
the Texas Courts had followed a discriminatory practice that vio-
lated federal constitutional norms of equal protection.  So the suit
is one to enjoin an illegal practice that had been sanctioned by the
Texas Supreme Court.  At this point the argument is only that
Texas has to use the same set of discretionary criteria to decide on
whether to bring prosecution on the statute for the parents of le-
gitimate and illegitimate children alike.  At the outset, it seems
within the scope of a court of equity to impose that requirement,
without asking it to monitor individual cases.  At this point, the
resolution of the case starts to look like that appropriate in Lujan,
for in both the gist of the order sought is to extend the application
of a statute to a class of cases from which it has been illegally and
systematically excluded.  It could well follow that forcing a change
in state policies will not cure any illegal situation.  But by the
same token it could be expected to have at least some substantial
effect, even only because of its hortatory effect on local officials.
Accordingly, the standing should have been recognized, and as-
suming that the constitutional violation was made out, a first
round of equitable relief ordered.  It could wait for a later day to
see whether a court of equity should refuse to intervene further in
any dispute that might arise over the interpretation and applica-
tion of the earlier judicial order.  It makes no sense for the doc-
trine of standing to nip the issue in the bud.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: TYING UP A FEW LOOSE ENDS
The central thesis of this paper is that the current confusion
and dissatisfaction with the doctrine of standing follow from the
Court’s total failure to appreciate the differences in the way in
which the legal and equitable principles that apply to any state
court of general jurisdiction carry over to the exercise of equitable
jurisdiction in the federal courts.
This account of standing goes a long way to obviate the vexed
constitutional question raised in Lujan as to whether Congress
can fix up the defects in the standing doctrine by authorizing citi-
zen suits in environmental cases.  Justice Powell added endless
confusion to this question in Warth when he suggested that some
components of the standing doctrine were “prudential,” while
others, including the requirement that “plaintiff still must allege a
distinct and palpable injury to himself” were not.140  The distinc-
tion makes no sense.  Article III says that the “judicial Power shall
extend to all Cases in Law and Equity, arising under . . . .”  carries
with it the clear implication that it does not extend to those cases
140 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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that do not “arise under” the appropriate classes of cases.  Thus, it
seems clear that Congress could not authorize the Court to hear
advisory opinions because these do not count as cases at all.
It follows therefore that Justice Scalia was correct insofar as
he concluded in Lujan that Congress could not simply authorize a
citizen suit in federal court if the requirement of a discrete and
palpable injury were cut from the same constitutional cloth as the
prohibition of an advisory opinion.  But it is not.  Once the equita-
ble jurisdiction of the Court is acknowledged, then citizen or tax-
payer suits to enjoin illegal conduct or to require the issuing of a
regulation in accordance with law fall squarely within the judicial
power, just as these suits do in private litigation.  At this point no
congressional authorization of these suits must be supplied.  In-
deed, to be more emphatic, any effort by Congress to strip the Su-
preme Court of its appellate jurisdiction to hear these issues
would itself raise serious constitutional issues, especially if its
purpose was to insulate congressional action from judicial review.
One central task of the courts in a system of judicial review is
to make sure that the legislature and the executive do not exceed
their respective powers.  That much is required by the rule of law.
The invocation of a convoluted doctrine of standing, such as that
now practiced in the Supreme Court, is wholly antithetical to that
objective and amounts to the partial overruling of Marbury v.
Madison without any textual or structural warrant for that rever-
sal of policy.  Herein lies perhaps the greatest irony about our
level of collective trust in constitutional safeguards for the rule of
law.  The English Constitution contains no explicit power of judi-
cial review, and no limitations on Parliamentary power.  The doc-
trine of standing is part and parcel of their judicial law.  England
too has been subject to the powerful winds of the welfare state,
and has adopted many substantive policies that I regard as in-
defensible and self-destructive.  But on this standing issue it has
followed a more sensible path.  In speaking of its doctrine of stand-
ing, Wade and Forsyth disposed of the problems that have
plagued American constitutional law in a few sentences when
they observed that unless some method is given to challenge ille-
gal administrative actions, “the rule of law breaks down.”141  The
irony is of course that the broader view on illegality and standing
is taken in a system that has no explicit constitutional guarantees
of individual rights.  But perhaps one important lesson shines on
this bit of comparative history.  Perhaps we can learn one lesson.
The safety of a nation depends as much on the strength of its insti-
tutions and citizens as it does on the written provisions of its Con-
141 See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 9, at 696.
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stitution.  And the sad point here is that, in the case of standing in
law and equity it need not be this way.
